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In 1993 Zheng-Seberry presented a public key cryptosystem that was considered 
efficient and secure in the sense of indistinguishability of encryptions (IND) against an 
adaptively chosen ciphertext adversary (CCA2). This thesis shows the Zheng-Seberry 
scheme is not secure as a CCA2 adversary can break the scheme in the sense of IND. In 
1998 Cramer-Shoup presented a scheme that was secure against an IND-CCA2 
adversary and whose proof relied only on standard assumptions. This thesis modifies 
this proof and applies it to a modified version of the El-Gamal scheme. This resulted in 
a provably secure scheme relying on the Random Oracle (RO) model, which is more 
efficient than the original Cramer-Shoup scheme. Although the RO model assumption 
is needed for security of this new El-Gamal variant, it only relies on it in a minimal 
way. 
In 1997 Zheng introduced a new notion called signcryption, a combination of signature 
and encryption. Zheng gave some details and properties of this new notion but did not 
include any formal definitions about the notions of security for a signcryption scheme. 
This thesis presents some formal notions of security for signcryption schemes, based on 
accepted notions of security for encryption and signature schemes. 
Three new signcryption schemes are presented that are based on provably secure 
encryption schemes. The security of these new schemes is presented in terms of the 
new notions of security for signcryption schemes. Strong arguments are made for the 
security of these new schemes, formal proofs are not given as that would be a bold 
claim for schemes based on such new theory. 
Some discussion is given about the possibilities of combining weak encryption with 
strong signatures to achieve stronger encryption. Intuitively the concept seems correct 
but proofs remain elusive. The idea of combining strong encryption and weak 
signatures is also discussed but appears less promising. 
Also, some minor properties of elliptic curves are given. The theorems most probably 
are not original, but have been rediscovered by the author. Where it was discovered that 
a theorem was previously known, it is referenced. The theorems presented, whilst 
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C H A P T E R 1 INTRODUCTION 
The right to privacy is one of but a handful of rights that belong to every free 
individual. This right however, is becoming more and more difficult to maintain as 
information becomes the most prized commodity of the new millennium. This 
Information Age or Digital Age has brought about an unimaginable amount of 
information exchange, from one side of the world to the other, in the blink of an eye. 
So to where do we look to protect this vast and valuable commodity? We look to 
computer security and the theory of cryptography. 
Public key cryptography is an important part in the theory of cryptography, it allows 
two people (let's assign them randomly chosen names, Alice and Bob), who have 
never meet each other, to communicate confidentially. Public key cryptography was 
essentially discovered by Whitfield Diffie and Martin Hellman in 1976 [18], when 
they discovered a way for Alice and Bob to create a shared secret key. From here 
actual public key cryptosystems were devised, such as one by Rivest, Shamir and 
Adleman [56] (RSA) and El-Gamal [21]. These two cryptosystems to this day 
underiie the majority of pubHc key cryptosystems. 
Security is the most important property of any public key cryptosystem, it is also the 
most difficult to show. The security of a scheme is always based on some 
assumptions. An adversary with access to unlimited resources, that wants to break a 
public key cryptosystem, always can. Hence assumptions are made that define the 
resources of an adversary and the way in which they are trying to break the 
cryptosystem. 
Proving the security of a public key cryptosystem is a concept that has been around 
for ahnost as long as public key cryptography. Li a scheme by Rabin [54] (1979) he 
presented a scheme that was as intractable as factoring, under certain (strong) 
assumptions. However, provable security is a very difficult goal and often comes at 
the cost of efficiency. Nevertheless, it is a goal that many public key cryptosystems 
are now achieving, and should be the goal of all such future cryptosystems. 
Zheng-Seberry [70] presented a scheme in 1993 and gave a proof for its security. 
Their scheme represented one of the first schemes considered secure against the most 
powerful attacker cryptographic theory defines, and yet at the same time was very 
practical. 0 of this thesis shows for the first time that their proof is not valid. This 
result should be credited equally to the author of this thesis and Assoc. Prof Josef 
Pieprzyk as it was arrived at by this author during discussions with Assoc. Prof 
Pieprzyk. Having broken the scheme, the focus is on repairing it. 
The task of repairing Zheng-Seberry led the author to create an El-Gamal variant 
that's security involves adapting a proof from a scheme by Cramer-Shoup [15]. 
Although the variant and its proof are 100% the work of the author, Dr David 
Pointcheval helped verify the proof The Cramer-Shoup scheme has the distinction of 
being the first provably secure public key cryptosystem that is practical, and whose 
proof relies only on standard assumptions. It makes sense then to try to adapt this 
proof to prove the security of other cryptosystems. The Cramer-Shoup proof cannot 
be directly applied to a new El-Gamal variant but aspects of its construction can be 
borrowed to develop a new proof 
The elliptic curve implementation of Zheng-Seberry is an important variant of the 
original. It turns out we can use the points on elliptic curves in much the same way 
we use counting numbers, but most importantly a discrete logarithm problem for 
elliptic curves can be defined. Interestingly, the elliptic curve discrete logarithm 
problem is currently a more difficult computational problem to solve than the standard 
discrete logarithm problem. This means cryptosystems based on the elliptic curve 
discrete logarithm problem can be implemented more efficiently. Hence the study of 
elliptic curves is a very important area. 
Public key cryptography can achieve more than just confidentiality, it can also 
achieve authentication. Authentication is a process where if Bob receives a message 
from Alice, Bob can verify that Alice did indeed write the message. Alice provides 
this authentication by digitally signing the message she sends Bob. This digital 
signature is analogous in many ways to a hand written signature. As with encryption 
schemes, it is important for digital signature schemes to be secure and efficient. 
Signcryption is a notion that was introduced by Zheng [68] and, as the name suggests, 
combines digital signatures and encryption. The combination is not trivial like 
concatenation, but must achieve the goal of having the 'cost' of the signcryption 
scheme less than the cost of the signature and encryption schemes taken 
independently. The goal of signcryption is to combine authentication and 
confidentiality in such a way as to get an advantage over doing them independently. 
Although Zheng introduced the notion of signcryption, he did not include formal 
definitions and theories describing the security of signcryption schemes. Zheng did 
present a description of signcryption and many of its desirable properties. Also 
presented was a signcryption scheme and a sound argument for its security, yet 
without formal definitions of what it means for a signcryption scheme to be secure, 
we cannot be as confident about its security as we would like. 
Definitions for the security of a signcryption scheme are solely the work of the author 
and are presented for the first time in Chapter 5. This task is made simpler by 
signcryption being a natural combination of digital signatures and encryption, both of 
which have well defined notions of security. This task is not simple though, as 
intertwining two theories is fraught with pitfalls. This is the first such attempt at 
formally defining security for signcryption and undoubtedly as this new notion 
matures so must these definitions develop too. 
With definitions for the security of signcryption, the development of new signcryption 
schemes can proceed with some confidence. In Chapter 6 this thesis presents three 
new signcryption schemes. The importance of provable security has been alluded too 
for confidentiality, and the same is true for signcryption schemes. Hence these new 
signcryption schemes all have underlying encryption schemes that are provably 
secure. Of course this does not guarantee the security of the signcryption scheme, but 
it is a good place to start. The arguments given for the security of these three new 
schemes are not formal proofs, since that is not a claim that could be made with 
confidence for such new theory. 
The rest of this thesis is laid out in the following order. Chapter 2 describes the 
mathematical background required to understand public key cryptography and some 
formal definitions about the security of encryption schemes. Also, the theory of 
elliptic curves is reviewed and some minor theorems presented. Chapter 3 presents a 
review of previous schemes that are provably secure and presents the development of 
proving security for cryptosystems. Some relevant signature schemes are also 
reviewed. Chapter 4 describes in more detail the original Zheng-Seberry scheme and 
how it can be broken by an adversary. A modified version of the Cramer-Shoup proof 
is then used to show the security of an El-Gamal variant. Chapter 5 adds some 
substance to the theory of signcryption by formalising notions of security for it. 
Chapter 6 presents three new signcryption schemes and Chapter 7 poses some new, 
unanswered questions about the interplay between confidentiality and authentication. 
Chapter 8 offers some conclusions that can be drawn fi-om this thesis and Chapter 9 
gives the bibliography. 

C H A P T E R 2 MATHEMATICAL BACKGROUND 
2.1 Groups, Rings and Fields 
Algebraic structures are powerful mathematical constructs that immediately give 
information about their elements. They are important to appreciate in cryptography, 
as when working with an algebraic structure, for example a field, it is immediately 
known, for example, that every element has an inverse. Conversely, the inability to 
place elements of a cryptosystem in a well-defined algebraic structure can be 
important information in regards to the security of the cryptosystem. 
Only the basic algebraic structures have been defined here, as these tend to underlie 
more complex structures. 
2.1.1 Groups 
A group G is a set with a binary operation o defined on it, such that the following 
axioms are true. 
1. The binary operation is associative. 
{xo y)o Z = xo(yo z) \/x,y,z&G 
2. There is a unique identity element i. 
io X = xoi = X V x e G 
3. For each element x in G there is a unique inverse xmG. 
xox = x o x = i VjcgG 
The number of elements in a group is called its order. 
2.1.2 Rings 
A ring J? is a set with two binary operations + and o defined on it, such that the 
following axioms are true for all elements x,y,z in R. 
1. The + operation is commutative. 
x + y = y + X 
2. The + operation is associative. 
{x + y)+z = x + {y + z) 
3. There is a unique identity element /+ for the + operation. 
x + = + jc = A: 
4. Every element has a unique inverse {-x) under the + operation. 
5. The left distributive property. 
X o ( y - { - z ) = X o y - { - x o z 
6. The right distributive property. 
{x +y)o z = xo z +yo z 
7. The o operation is associative. 
(x o y^o z = X o(y o z) 
2.1.3 Fields 
A ring R can have additional algebraic properties defined on it. 
1. A ring R is commutative (or abelian) if xoy = yox \fx,yeR 
2. A ring R has a unique identity element i, for the o operation if 
xoi, =i^ox = x VJCG 
3. Every element of R has a unique inverse x under the o operation. 
xox = xo x = VxeR 
A field is a ring with all of the above three extra properties. 
The size of a field can be infinite such as Q, IR or C, they can also be finite such as 
Zp, the set of integers fi"om 0 to /? - 1 for some prime p. 
2.2 Number Theory 
Number theory is cryptographers 'bread and butter'; it is the foundations upon which 
everything is built. This section highlights the main theorems and definitions that will 
be relevant to this thesis. Proofs have been omitted, but [1, 12, 14, 23, 30, 37, 44, 50, 
63] contain all relevant proofs and cover all the necessary background to understand 
the mathematics of public key cryptography. 
This section will work with a finite set of integers, Z„, or the integers fi-om 0 to « - 1. 
This set is a commutative ring with identity. This means that if the binary operations 
are addition and multiplication it can't be guaranteed that every element will have a 
multiplicative inverse. 
2.2.1 Modulo Arithmetic 
Cryptographers work with groups and fields and the simplest groups and fields are 
those associated with integers with operations based on modulo integer arithmetic. 
Fortunately computers are most suited to finite precision arithmetic, leading to 
efficient implementations. So a finite set of integers are used for public key 
cryptography, and any integers that are larger than the maximum element are replaced 
by an element in the set that is congruent to it. For example, if working with integers 
modulo 5, then 7 would be replaced with 2, or 
7 = 2 mod 5 
It is said that 7 reduced modulo 5, is equivalent, or congruent to 2. 
2.2.2 Euler's Theorem 
Euler's theorem is a generalisation of Fermât's Little Theorem, so understanding 
Fermât's Little Theorem is essential. First let /? | a be read as "/? divides meaning 
that p divides into a an integer amount of times. Similarly, \Qt p \ a be read as 
does not divide a". 
Theorem 1 (Fermât 's Little Theorem) I f p is a prime and p i a, then cP'^ = 1 mod p. 
This theorem is true when working modulo a prime, but Euler extended it to any 
number n. To understand Euler's theorem, Euler's phi-function (sometimes called the 
indicator or totient function) must first be introduced. 
Definition 1 [12, pg. 136] For « > 1, let (¡¡(n) denote the number of positive integers 
not exceeding n that are relatively prime to n. 
Euler's phi-function can be best illustrated with an example. ^30) = 8, or there are 8 
integers that are less than 30 and relatively prime (or co-prime) to 30, they are 1, 7, 
11, 13, 17, 19, 23, 29. The phi-function is extremely important (eg in RSA) and is 
difficult to calculate for large n. However, when n=p, where p is prime, then (fip) = 
p - \ . Note also that /̂̂ (w) is a multiplicative function, for example iz5(30) = (¡{2) 2̂5(15) 
= (fil) (/jQ) iz5(5). This means that (l^n) can be easily calculated if n can be factored 
into its prime factors. 
Now Euler's theorem can be given. 
Theorem 2 (Euler) I f n is a positive integer and gcd(a, n) = 1 then = 1 mod n. 
This theorem is the foundation of much of public key cryptography. 
2.2.3 Orders and Generators 
When working in Z„ the order of an element is defined to be: 
Definition 2 [12, pg. 156] Let « < 1 and gcd(ûî, n) = \. The order of a modulo n is the 
smallest positive integer k such that a^ = Imod« . 
If an element belongs to a group (or ring or field), then the order of the element must 
divide the order of the group. 
An element's order allows us to define whether or not it is a primitive root. 
Definition 3 [12, pg. 159] If gcd(a, n) = 1 and is of order (l)(n) modulo n, then a is a 
primitive root of n. 
The usefulness of primitive roots can be seen from the next theorem. 
Theorem 3 Let gcd(a, n) = 1 and let ai, a2, be the positive integers less than 
n and relatively prime to n. If a is a primitive root of n, then 
fl, 
are congruent modulo n to a\, a2, ..., a^n), in some order. 
Specifically, when n=p, then the powers of a primitive root, g, will generate all the 
positive integers less thanp, hence g is called a generator. 
A useful result of the above theorem is the following corollary. 
Corollary If n has a primitive root, then it has exactly of them. 
So when n = p, p - \ has a large prime factor, the number of generators can be 
easily found. 
2.3 Discrete Logarithm Problem 
The Discrete Logarithm Problem (DLP) is the basis for many cryptosystems, of these 
El-Gamal [21] is perhaps the best known, and it has numerous variants. The 
definition of the DLP is given in Definition 4. 
Definition 4 {Discrete Logarithm Problem) Given a prime number p and two other 
numbers g and>^ (between 1 and p-\\ find a number x such that y = g^ mod p. 
The definition has been given for a cyclic group of integers, but it can be generahsed 
to any group (see [46, pg. 104]). 
The algorithms that have been devised to solve the DLP can depend on the underlying 
group. There are algorithms that are independent of the group, eg exhaustive search, 
the baby-step giant-step algorithm [46, §3.6.2] and Pollard's rho algorithm [46, 
§3.6.3]. Another algorithm that works in arbitrary groups but is particularly efficient 
if the group has only small prime factors, is the Pohlig-Hellman algorithm [46, 
§3.6.4]. The fastest known algorithms for solving the DLP only work on certain 
groups and are variants of the index calculus algorithm [46, §3.6.5]. The running time 
of the index calculus method is sub-exponential, given as LqlVi, c] where Lg[a, c] = 
0(exp((c + o(l))(ln ^)"(ln In q)^'^) with c a positive constant and a satisfying 0 < a < 
1. Note, when a = 0 the running time is polynomial and when a = 1 the running time 
is fully exponential. The fastest known algorithm for the DLP is a variant of the 
index calculus method running at L^[l/3, c]. 
2.4 RSA and El-Gamal Cryptosystems 
The RSA and El-Gamal cryptosystems are the basis for numerous cryptosystems. 
Since most cryptosystems discussed in this thesis are based on these systems, how 
they work will be outlined here. 
RSA 
Preliminaries 
Generate two strong primes p and q. Calculate their product pq. 
Key Generation 
Generate a random number d as the pubhc key and solve iox em ed=\ mod ^{N) for 
the private key. 
Encryption 
Encrypt a message m. 
1) c^m'^modA'^ 
Ciphertext is c. 
Decryption 
1) m = c mod N 
The security of RSA lies in the necessity to factor the product of two large primes. 
However, the security has not been shown to be equivalent to this. 
£1-Gamal 
Preliminaries 
Work over GF(/7) with p a large prime and a generator g. 
Key Generation 
Choose a random x as a. private key and use jy = g^ mod /? as the public key. 
Encryption 
Encrypt message m 
1) Choose random r 
2) 
3) b=/m 
Ciphertext (a, b) 
Decryption 
l)m = bid" 
The security of El-Gamal lies in the difficulty of solving an instance of the discrete 
logarithm problem, actually the (semantic) security of this most basic version of El-
Gamal has been shown equivalent to the Decision Diffie-Hellman Problem [64]. 
Both RSA and El-Gamal are secure against a chosen message attacker but in their 
most basic forms are insecure against an adaptive adversary. The definitions of these 
adversaries are in section 2.7. 
2.5 Elliptic Curves 
Elliptic curves get their name as they were originally used to calculate the 
circumference of an ellipse. Elliptic curves are useful in cryptography because the 
points on an elliptic curve form an abelian group and this allows the creation of a 
cryptographic scheme based on the discrete logarithm problem. 
Some good sources of information on elliptic curves are [20, 28, 34, 38, 61, 67] and 
there implementation [6, 33, 39,42]. 
2.5.1 Definition 
Plane curves are equations that satisfy F{x, y) = 0. The simplest plane curves are lines 
(of degree 1 in x andy) and conic sections (of degree 2 in andjv). The next simplest 
are cubic curves, which include elliptic curves. 
The elliptic curves that will be considered are those in the Weierstrass equation form. 
The most general form, in affine coordinates, is given below. 
y^ + a^xy + a^y = x^ + a^x^ + a^x + a^ Equation 1 
The Weierstrass equation can be expressed in projective coordinates involving X, Y 
and Z. There is exactly one point on the elliptic curve where Z = 0, namely (0, 1, 0) 
and so in affme coordinates (where x = X/Z2indy = YIZ) this point is given a special 
value, 0, which is referred to as the point at infinity. The point at infinity is the 
identity element for the group. 
Elliptic curves used in cryptography are defined over a finite field K and are required 
to be non-singular (their determinant 0). 
The equation for the elliptic curve can be simplified fiirther if the characteristic of the 
underlying field K is restricted. There are two restrictions that are used in 
cryptography, when the underlying field has characteristic greater than 3 and when it 
has characteristic equal to 2. 
For an elliptic curve E, defined over a field K with characteristic greater than 3, then 
by a simple change of variables the equation for E becomes: 
E:y^=x^+ax + b a,b G K Equation 2 
Most often in cryptography this type of curve is used when the underlying field is 
GF(/7) (or some extension field of this), with p prime. For this type of curve to be 
non-singular it is required that + ^ Omodp . 
If the characteristic of ̂  is equal to 2, then the equation for E becomes: 
E:y^ +xy = x^ +ax^ +b a,beK Equation 3 
For cryptographic purposes this curve is most often used when the underlying field is 
GF(2'"). For this type of curve to be non-singular it is required that b ^ 0. Curves 
over GF(2'") are used in most implementations of elliptic curve cryptography as they 
lend themselves to the most efficient implementation in computers. 
2.5.2 Addition 
The group addition for elliptic curves is defined by the chord and tangent rule. If E is 
defined over the real numbers then the addition rule can be seen graphically, in Figure 
1 . 
Figure 1 - A graphical representation of adding two points P and 2 on an elliptic 
curve, to get a resultant point R. 
To add two points P = (xj, yj) and Q = fc, y2) on an elliptic curve, a line is drawn 
through them, and it can be shown that this line is guaranteed to intersect the curve at 
exactly one other point (or 0). The negative of the intersection point is then taken, 
and this is the result R = {x3, ys). If P = Q then the line taken is the tangent of the 
curve at that point. lfP = -Q then the result is 0. 
Mathematically, addition is trying to find the third point of intersection between 
Equation 4 (a straight line) and Equation 5 (an elliptic curve). 
/ \ yi-yx 
J + = ŷ  Equation 4 
y^ = x^ + ax-\-b Equation 5 
By eliminating j; we arrive at a cubic, comparing the x^ coefficient of this with that of 
(x - X-̂  - X^ ~ ) = ^ 
gives Equation 6. 
Xj + Xj x^ — ̂  
^^ Equation 6 
Now that X3 can be found, Equation 4 can be used to find y3, giving Equation 7 
(remember the negative point is needed so the y coordinate is negated). 
>̂1 Equation 7 
The addition formulas are slightly different when working over a field with 
characteristic 2, so a summary of both is given below. 
When working over GF(p) with P = (xi,yi) and Q = (x2, yi), and P ^ -Q, then P + Q = 
(^3, Js) where 
and 
yi-yx 




If P = -Q then P + Q = 0. Also if P = {x, y) then -P = {x, -y). 
If working over GF(2'") then the equations become 
yi-yx 
X, + y, 
ifP*Q 
ifP = Q 
X-, = 
a + À^ +À + Xi+X2, if P^Q 
a + A'+A, ifP = Q 
If P = (x, y) then - P = (x,x+ y). 
These are the methods used in the P1363 standard (draft 7-16-99) [29]. Subtraction 
for elliptic curves is achieved by adding the negative of a point. 
2.5.3 Scalar Multiplication 
The other group operation for elliptic curves is scalar multiplication. This is achieved 
by repeated addition, for example, consider multiplying the point P by 5. 
5P = P + ((P + P) + (P + P)) 
In this case calculating 5P requires 3 additions. However there are faster ways to 
achieve scalar multiphcation, the method used in the PI363 standard [29] is as 
follows. 
P1363 A.10.3 
Input: an integer n and an elliptic curve point P. 
Output: the elliptic curve point nP. 
1. If n = 0 then output 0 and stop. 
2. If n < 0 the set Q <- (-P) and k <- (-«), else set g <- P and A: <- n. 
3. Let hi /i/_i... A1 ho be the binary representation of 3 A;, where the most significant bit A/ is 1. 
4. Let kiki^i...kiko be the binary representation of k. 5. S e t 5 < - g . 
6. For / from I - 1 downto 1 do 
Set <-25. 
l îhi= 1 and = 0 then confute <S <- 5 + ^ via A.10.1 or A.10.2. 
If hi = 0 and k = 1 then compute 5 <- - 0 via A. 10.1 or A. 10.2. 
7. Output S. 
This method is similar to better known square-and-multiply method normally 
associated with exponentiation. 
2.5.4 Number of Points 
Cryptosystems based on the discrete logarithm over finite fields have their security 
depend heavily on the size of the group - the same is true for elliptic curves. The 
problem with elliptic curves is given a particular curve it is not always trivial to 
calculate the number of points on the curve. What is known though is the bound on 
the number of points, given an elliptic curve E defined over a finite field Fq with q = 
p"" (p is prime) then the number of points in E(Fg), denoted by #E(Fq) is given by. 
Theorem 4 (Hasse) Let #E(Fg) = q+l-t. Then \t\ <2 Vq. 
There is a polynomial time algorithm (due to Schoof [59]) that computes the number 
of points on an arbitrary elliptic curve, however it still is not very fast. This algorithm 
has been substantially sped up by Elkies [22] and Atkins [2], see also [31, 40, 43]. 
There are other ways to calculate the number of points, the complex multipUcation 
method [32, 36, 48] lets you choose some parameters related to the number of points 
on the curve and then finds a curve with that number of points. 
2.5.5 Elliptic Curve Discrete Logarithm 
The ElHptic Curve Discrete Logarithm Problem (ECDLP) is defined in an analogous 
way to the DLP. The analogies between the two can be seen in Table 1. 
Table 1 - Analogies between the DLP and the ECDLP. 
DLP ECDLP 
Setting GF{q) Curve E over GF {q) 
Basic operation Multiplication in GF {q) Addition of points 
Main operation Exponentiation Scalar multiplication 
Base element Generator^ base point G 
Base element order Prime r Primer 
Private key s (integer modulo r) s (integer modulo r) 
Public key fr (element of iF (point on £) 
Hence the definition of the ECDL problem is as follows. 
Definition 5 {ECDL) Given an ellptic curve E defined over a finite field Fq, and two 
points Py Q e E{Fq), find an integer t such that P = tQ, given that such an integer 
exists. 
What makes the ECDL problem interesting, is that unlike the DL problem for which 
there exists a sub-exponential algorithm (see section 2.3) for solving, no such 
algorithm works for the ECDL problem. The fastest known algorithms are still fiilly 
exponential. 
The reason for this is the sub-exponential algorithms based on the index calculus 
method require the use of a factor base, which when working in Z„ mean small prime 
numbers. However, to apply the same algorithm to elliptic curves, one would need 
'small prime points', a concept that is just not defined for elliptic curves. There have 
been attempts to define these for elliptic curves but as yet they have not been very 
successful. 
2.5.6 Supersingular and Anomalous Curves 
Although at present the ECDL is more difficult to solve than the DL, there are some 
elliptic curves for which the ECDL reduces to the difficulty of the DL problem. 
These curves are either supersingular curves or anomalous curves. 
Remember the bound on the number of points on an EC is given by i^E(Fq) = p+ I-
t, well supersingular curves are curves were p divides t. Since \t\ < this means 
that an elliptic curve defined over Fq is supersingular if ^ = 0, q, 2q, 3q or 4q. This 
requirement on an elliptic curve is known as the MOV condition as Menezes, 
Okamoto and Vanstone [41] discovered this reduction for supersingular curves. 
Anomalous curves are defined as curves where #E(Fq) = p. Smart [62]-Satoh-Araki 
57] showed that for such curves the ECDL could be reduced to the DL problem. 
2.5.7 Isomorphic and Complimentary Curves 
There is a simple theorem that defines whether or not two curves are isomorphic to 
each other. 
Theorem 5 Two elliptic curves, Ej: y^ ax + b and E2: y^ +ax + b, over 
the field K are isomorphic over K if and only if there exists a u e K* such that 
u^a = a and u^b = b. The isomorphism is given by 
or equivalently 
The advantage of knowing about isomorphic curves is that if you know the number of 
points on one curve then all curves isomorphic to that curve have the same number of 
points. The isomorphism equations can be extended to the general curve given in 
Equation 1. 
It is easy to find an isomorphic curve if you know a and b in terms of some generator 
g, say a = and b = g^, then an isomorphic curve is a = and b = g'^''^, 
Another relation between curves is complimentary curves [17] (also known as the 
twist of a curve). EC points exists where x^ + ax + bis SL quadratic residue, however 
complimentary curves (E) have points where this value is a quadratic non-residue. 
The element y is now expressed SiSy = MVV where v is a fixed quadratic non-residue. 
These points form an abelian group and have virtually identical rules for addition, 
differing only by the Vv which is associated with the coordinate. 
As given in Theorem 4 the number of points on an EC are M = jr? + 1 - t. The 
property of compUmentary curves that makes them useful is the number of points on 
the comphmentary curve of E is given by #£=/?+ 1 + 
2.5.8 Some Minor Theorems 
Here are some interesting theorems about some global properties of elliptic curves. 
The theorems presented are most likely not new work, but they were rediscovered by 
the author, and are presented with the hope that at least the proofs represent original 
work. 
Theorem 6 shows how to transform an elliptic curve with #E] = p + I - t to another 
elliptic curve with #£2 = p + I + t. It is practically useful as if the number of points 
on one curve is known, it essentially doubles the number of elliptic curves where the 
number of points can be calculated for virtually no cost. 
This is not a new result, it can be found in [7], however the author believes the proof 
provided to be original. 
Theorem 6 For an EC E\: y^ = x^ + ax + b modulo a prime p (with generator g), 
where a = g" and b = g"^ and #Ei = p + I - t, then the curve E^ '.y^ =x^ +dx + b 
where a = g"^^ and b = has m=P + l+ t. 
Proof. 
The isomorphism equations fi"om Theorem 5 are used to show how every value of 
E that is a quadratic residue becomes a quadratic non-residue. 
Remember the isomorphic transform equations: 
Let u = now when c is even it is the case of an isomorphic transform, here is 
considered the case when c is odd. 
The equations now become 
3c 
{ J ^ y V y 
With c odd the final expression is the form of a point on a complimentary EC (g is a 
generator and hence a quadratic non-residue), hence every point on the E\ is changed 
to a point on £2, and so #£2 = p +l - t. But £2 is the complimentary curve of E2, 
meaning #£"2 =p + \ +1.\ 
This theorem basically doubles the number of curves where the number of points is 
known, all from one original curve, E\. Now all curves isomorphic to Ej and E2 are 
known. 
The next two theorems present some interesting, but not practically useful properties 
of elliptic curves. 
Theorem 7 Let E(a, b) be an elliptic curve over GF(p) with a,b e GF(p). Then the 
following summations hold: 
(a) '"^#E{a,b) = p(p + \) 
b=0 a=const 
That is the sum of the order of all elliptic curves with constant a, and b varying 
over GF(p) is equal to p(p+l). 
a=0 b=0 
That is the sum of the order of all elliptic curves with b = 0 and a varying over 
GF(p) is equal to p(p+\). 
(c) "^#E{a,b) = p{p + 2) 
a = 0 b=q.r. 
That is the sum of the order of all elliptic curves with b a quadratic residue (q.r.) 
and a varying over GF(p) is equal to p(p+2). 
(d) = 
a=0 b=q.n.r. 
That is the sum of the order of all elliptic curves with b a quadratic non-residue 
(q.n.r.) and a varying over GF(p) is equal top^. 
Proof 
(a) The number of points on an elliptic curve can be calculated by 
) where the expression in the big brackets 
x=p-\ 
JC=0 
x^ +ax + b 
/ 3 T ^ X +ax + b 
I P 
fixed gives: 
) represents the Jacobi symbol. Summing this over all b with a 
b=p-\ 
S 
6 = 0 a=const 
x=p-\ 
1 + 1 ( 1 
;c=0 






= p ( p + i ) + S I 
;c=0 6=0 
x^ + ax-\-b 
P 
x^ + ax+ b 
= p(p + l) 
The double sum (in the second to last line) goes to zero as for a particular value of x 
all the Jacobi symbols of all elements of GF(p) are being summed. To see this 
consider the term w = x^+ax in the inner sum, it is constant. Now the sum of 
for all ¿>'s in GF(p) is zero, as w+6 will be a permutation of GF(p). 











1 + p + Z 
x=Q 
\ X +ax 
/ 
^ 3 
X +ax x=p-\ a=p-\ = p(p+\)+ X I 
x=0 a=0 
= P(P + 1) 
Again, the double sum goes to zero as is constant and with jc constant and a co-
prime to p then ax is a permutation on GF(/7). So the sum of the Jacobi symbols will 
equate to zero. Note, when x = 0 the Jacobi symbol will also be zero. 
(c) Using the exactly same argument as in (b), but adding a constant b term (where b 
is a q.r.). The only difference is when x = 0, to show this difference the double sum is 
evaluated below: 
a=p-\ x=p-\ a=p-\ 
S I x=0 a = 0 b=q.r. 
X -\-ax-\-b 
a=0 b=q.r. 
= I T + I I J x=l a=0 b=q.r. 
= P 
Now putting the result of the double sum back into the same line of equations as (b), 
then we get p{p+l) +p= p{p+2). 
(d) Now is a q.n.r, hence the double sum from (c) becomes givingp{p+l) -p = 
Theorem 8 Let E be an elliptic curve over GF(p), p a prime, then the values for the 
number ofpoints on the curve #E have the following form when either a orb = 0 : 
(a) When p = l mod 6 and g is a generator for GF(p), then 
(i) #E(0, g^) = 6k; and g^ is a quadratic residue and g^ mod p for 
some d. 
(ii) = 6/ + 1 
(Hi) #E(0, = 6m + 3 
(iv) #E(0, g'^^) = 6« + 4 
(v) M(0, = 6o + 3 
(vi) #E(0, g'^^) =6r+I 
and k + l + m + n + o + r + 2=p + l. 
(b) Whenp =5 mod 6 then #E(0, b) = p+\. 
(c) When p = \ mod 4 and g is a generator for GF(p) then 
(i) 0) = 4^ and g^ is a quadratic residue 
(ii) 0)=4t + 2 
(Hi) O; = 4w 
(iv) o; = 4v + 2 
and s + t + u + v + l=p + L 
(d) Whenp =3 mod4 then #E(a, 0) = p. 
Proof 
(a)(i) Consider the following: 
- When p = \ mod 6 ( = 1 mod 3) then 3 real cube roots of exist, hence if 
+ is a quadratic residue then the other roots of will also make + 
a qr, each of which contribute 2 points, giving a total of 6. There are k -
1 such triplets. 
- When X = 0, since g^ is a qr this yields 2 points. 
- Since g ' ^ mod p, meaning g ' has a cube root hence there are 3 values 
of jc which make = 0 modp, yielding 3 points. 
Adding the above together gives g') = 6{k-\) + 2 + 3 + 1 point at infinity - 6k. 
(ii) Now g"^^ is not a qr and there is no d such that / = -g^'^, hence #E(0, g'')-61+I. 
Oii) Now is a qr and there is no d such that g' = -g^"^, hence #E(0, g') = 6m + 3. 
(iv) Now g"^^ is not a qr and there is a d such that g'' = -g^^, hence #E(0, = 6n + 4. 
(v) Now g"̂ "̂  is a qr and there is no d such that g ' = hence #^(0, = +1. 
(vi) Now g"^^ is a not qr and there is no d such that / = hence #E{0, g') = 6r+i. 
Summing these 6 orders gives (ók) + (6/+1) + (6m+3) + (6n+4) + (6o+3) + (6H-1) = 
6{k+l+m+n+o+r+2), and there are (p-i)/6 such groups (as = 1 mod 6), summing 
these gives (p - i){k+1 + m + n + o + r + 2). From Theorem 7 the sum of #^(0, b) for 
all 6 is/?(/?+1). Hence 
p(p+i) = (p - i)(k+l + m + w + o + r + 2) + #E{0, 0) 
= (p- ì)lk+l + m + n + o + r + 2) + (p+ì) 
z=>k+l + m + n + o + r + 2=p+ì. 
(b) Well known result, see [45]. When p = 5 mod 6 (= 2 mod 3) then x^ is a 
permutation on GF(p) and so is jĉ  + b, hence there will be (p - l)/2 qr yielding^ - 1 
points, plus one point when x^ + b = 0, and the point at infinity, totalling;? + 1 points. 
(b) (i) Consider the following: 
- When p = 1 mod 4, if JC makes jĉ  +ax a qr then so does -x, each x yields 2 
points so both give 4 points. There are 5 - 1 such pairs. 
- Now g^ is a qr hence -g^ is a qr then there are 2 x values such that x - g^x = 
x{x̂  - gO = 0, yielding 2 points. 
- x = 0 will give 1 point. 
Totalling #E(g\ 0) = 4(5-1) + 2 + 1 + 1 point at infinity = 45. 
(ii) Now g"" is not a qr hence #E(g^ 0) = 4/ + 2. 
Òii) See (i). 
(iv) See (ii). 
Summing the four cases 4(5 + / + M + v + 1), there are (p -1)/4 such quartets, so again 
p(p+ì) = (p-ì){s + t + u + v+ì) + #E(0,0) 
= ( / 7 - L ) ( 5 + I + M + V + L ) + ( P + L ) 
=>5 + I + M + V+L =p+i. 
(d) Well known result, see [45]. When = 3 mod 4, if x makes jĉ  +ax a qr then -x 
makes it a quadratic non-residue. Hence there are (p - l)/2 qr each yielding 2 points 
for a total of (p - 1) points, plus one point at x = 0, adding the point at infinity gives 
p+1 points. I 
Corollary: Using Theorem 8 and its notation, then a curve E: y^ = x^ + g^x + g^ with 
#E = p + Ì ^ t. and so from Theorem 6 the curve E : y^ = x^ + g^'^^x + g'^*^ has 
p + l + t. Applying this to Theorem 8 (a) and (c) the following relations can be 
derived: 
(a) (i) k + n = ^ 3 
p-l (ii) I+ 0 = 




(b) (i) s + 2 p-\ 
(11) v + t=-
Proof. 
(a) (i) Since the number of points on the curves from Theorem 8 (a)(i) and (a)(iv) can 
be related (from Theorem 6), then: 
6k = p + \-t 
6« + 4 = /7 + l + i 
Adding these two equations and simplifying yields: 
6(A: + «) + 4 = 2/? + 2 
k+n=— 3 
(ii) Same as (i) using curves from Theorem 8 (a)(ii) and (a)(v). 
(iii) Same as (i) using curves from Theorem 8 (a)(iii) and (a)(vi). 
(b) (i) Same as (a)(i) using curves from Theorem 8 (c)(i) and (c)(iii). 
(ii) Same as (a)(i) using curves from Theorem 8 (c)(ii) and (c)(iv). | 
Conjecture: The k and n from Theorem 8 (a)(i) and (iv) are both even. 
Progress. We know that k + n is even as (/? - l)/3 is even, hence either k and n are 
even or they are odd. The conjecture arose from the observation (from about 30 
consecutive cases) that both k and n were always divisible by 4. | 
Conjecture: Forp = 5 mod 6 andp= \ mod 6, and some generator g: #^(0, / ) + #E(0, + mo, = 3(p+i) 
Progress. Trivially true when p = 5 mod 6. Otherwise saying: 
3(p + 1) = {ek) + (6m + 3) + (60 + 3) = 6(A:+ m + o + 1) 
_ C/' + l) 
2 =k+m+o+\ 
and 
3(/7 + 1) = (6/+ 1) + (6« + 4) + (6r + 1) = 6(/ + « + r + 1) 
2.6 EC-RSA and EC-El-Gamal 
Cryptosystems 
As with the original RSA, EC-RSA has its security based on the difficulty of 
factoring. This is achieved by carefully choosing primes such that when the EC over 
IN is used, the number of points on the curve is known. 
EC-RSA 
Preliminaries 
Choose p and q so that both are congruent to 2 mod 3 and compute N - pq. This 
ensures that the number of points on the curve #E(0, b) = (p+l)(q+IX for any b. 
Key Generation 
Randomly select e such that gcd(e, {p + \){q + 1)) = 1. Compute d such that ed - 1 
mod ip + \){q + 1). 
Encryption 
Encrypt message m 
1) Convert m to an EC point (x, y) 
2) Calculate e • {x, y) = {c\, C2) 
Ciphertext (ci, cz) 
Decryption 
1) Calculate d- {c\, cj) = {x, 3̂ ) 
Supersingular curves are chosen in Fp and Fq as the number of points is already 
known for these curves and hence the number of points on the curve over IN can 
easily be determined. The security is based on factoring as factoring N breaks the 
cryptosystem. For more elliptic curve cryptosystems based on RSA see [17, 35, 47]. 
The EC El-Gamal cryptosystem is analogous to the original El-Gamal cryptosystem 
and hence its security is based on the ECDL problem. 
EC El-Gamal 
Preliminaries 
Choose a prime p and an EC curve E{a, b) over Fp. Find a generator point G on the 
EC that generates a large group of points. 
Key Generation 
Randomly select an integer a as the private key and calculate a-G = P as the public 
key. 
Encryption 
Encrypt message m 
1) Convert m to an EC point (jc, y) 
2) Randomly select k e Fp 
3) Compute k'P = {^,y) 
4) = xJ, C2 = 
Ciphertext {k • G, Cj, C2) 
Decryption 
1) Calculate a-k-G 
2) x = = % X y 
An actual implementation of this cryptosystem would be over the field as this 
leads to faster computations on a computer. One of the main issues in using a scheme 
like this is determining the number of points. The security is based on the ECDL 
problem and the difficulty of this is based on the size of the group, which for elliptic 
curves corresponds to the number of points. 
For both EC-RSA and EC- El-Gamal there are various methods to make the schemes 
more efficient and reduce overhead, see [29]. 
2.7 Notions of Security 
This section presents the notions of security for an encryption scheme. First the 
notation used to formally present the notions is given. Then the types of attacks on an 
encryption scheme are given, followed by the goals of an attacker. 
All definitions are taken from [3], it is the most complete treatise on this area and the 
reader is encouraged to be familiar with the paper. 
2.7.1 Notation 
If ^ is a probabiHstic algorithm, then A(xu X2, r) is the result of running A on 
inputs X2, ... and random number r. We let y <- A(xu X2, ...) denote the 
experiment of picking r at random and letting y be A(xu X2, r). If is a set then jc 
<- iS is the operation of picking an element uniformly from S. If a is neither an 
algorithm nor a set then <- a is a simple assignment statement. We say that;; can 
be output by A(xux2y ...) if there is some r such that A{xux2, ...; r) = y. 
The notion describing an asymmetric scheme can be formally defined via a triple of 
algorithms, n = C^, 5, V), where 
• the key generation algorithm, is a probabilistic algorithm that takes a security 
parameter A: e N (provided in unary) and returns a pair {pk, sk) of matching public 
and secret keys. 
• 5, the encryption algorithm, is a probabiHstic algorithm that takes a pubUc key pk 
and a message x E {0,1} to produce a ciphertext y. 
• V, the decryption algorithm, is a deterministic algorithm which takes a secret key 
sk and ciphertext to produce either a message x g {0, 1}* or a special symbol 0 
to indicate that the ciphertext was invalid. 
Let be a string of k binary 1 's. We require that for all {pk, sk) which can be output 
by for all X 6 {0, 1} , and for all y that can be output by Spk(x), we have that 
'̂ sk(y) = X. We also require that B and T> can be computed in polynomial time. As 
the notation indicates, the keys are indicated as subscripts to the algorithms. 
Recall that a fiinction s: N ^ IR is negligible if for every constant c > 0 there exists an 
integer kc such that z{k) < k'"" for all k > kc. 
2.7.2 Types of Attack 
An adversary A is regarded as a pair of probabilistic algorithms, A = (Au A2). (A is 
polynomial time if both Ai and A2 are.) This corresponds to A running in two 
"stages". The basic idea is that in the first stage the adversary, given the public key, 
seeks and outputs some "test instance", and in the second stage the adversary is issued 
a challenge ciphertext y generated as a probabilistic fiinction of the test instance. (In 
addition can output some state information 5 that will be passed to A2) 
Three types of attacks are considered under this setup. 
In a chosen-plaintext attack (CPA) the adversary can encrypt plaintexts of her 
choosing. Of course a CPA is unavoidable in a pubHc-key setting: knowing the 
public key, an adversary can, on her own, compute a ciphertext for any plaintext she 
desires. 
The CPA attack is possible for every public-key cryptosystem. The original RSA and 
El-Gamal cryptosystems are only secure against this type of attack. 
In a non-adaptive, chosen ciphertext attack (CCAl) we give A\ (the public key and) 
access to a decryption oracle, but we do not allow A2 access to a decryption oracle. 
Intuitively, this is allowing an attacker to query the decryption oracle with ciphertexts 
before receiving the challenge ciphertext. Once the challenge is received the attacker 
is not allowed access to the decryption oracle. 
The CCAl attack could model a situation were an employee decrypts ciphertexts of 
her choice at her place of business when no one else is around, like at lunch-time or 
late at night, hence this attack is referred to as the lunch-time or midnight attack. 
In an adaptively chosen ciphertext attack (CCA2) we continue to give A\ (the public 
key and) access to a decryption oracle, but also give Ai access to the same decryption 
oracle, with the only restriction that she cannot query the oracle on the challenge 
ciphertext;;. This is an extremely strong attack model. 
The CCA2 attack could model a situation where an attacker could send any ciphertext 
of their choice to an automated response server, which would return a message with 
the decrypted ciphertext. For example, an email automated response server, usually 
the received message (in this case the decrypted ciphertext) is also part of the reply 
email (with some check to see that the challenge ciphertext isn't responded too). 
Another situation could be one where a third party holds some encrypted key u and 
some credentials d, and anyone wanting to access the key needs to provide the correct 
credentials. 
At one stage during the development of these attacks CCAl was considered the 
strongest as some [16, 49] thought the notion of CCA2 was somewhat impractical, 
especially the condition that the adversary can ask the decryption any ciphertext apart 
fi-om the challenge ciphertext. However, CCA2 is still a plausible attack and for a 
cryptosystem to be secure against this type of attacker it is indeed a strong condition. 
It should be noted that these definitions are not attacks on a cryptosystem, but rather 
define the attacker we are considering. They basically define what the attacker has 
access to. Next we describe specific goals for the attacker to achieve. 
2.7.3 Indistinguishability of Encryptions. 
The classical goal of secure encryption is to preserve the privacy of messages: an 
adversary should not be able to learn from a ciphertext, information about its plaintext 
beyond the length of that plaintext. This notion is referred to as indistinguishability of 
encryptions (IND) and can be given a precise definition via the following simple 
experiment. 
"Algorithm AI is run on input the public key, pk. At the end of yii's 
execution it outputs a triple (XQ, X\, S), the first two components being 
messages which must be of the same length, and the last being state 
information (possible including pk) which the attacker wants to 
preserve. A random one of XQ and x\ is now selected, say, Xb. A 
"challenge" ;; is determined by encrypting Xb under pk. It is A2S job to 
try to determine if y was selected as the encryption of xo or xj, namely 
to determine the bit b. To make this determination A2 is given the 
saved state s and the challenge ciphertext;^." [3, pg. 32] 
We simultaneously define IND with respect to CPA, CCAl, and CCA2. The only 
difference lies in whether or not A\ and A2 are given the decryption oracles. We let 
the string 'atk' be instantiated by any of the formal symbols 'cpa', 'ccal', and 'cca2', 
while ATK is then the corresponding formal symbol from CPA, CCAl, and CCA2. 
When we say Oi = 8, where / g {1, 2}, we mean Oi is the function which, on any 
input, returns the empty string, s. 
Definition 6 [IND-CPA, IND-CCAl, IND-CCA2] Let 77= 5, V) be an encryption 
scheme and let ^ = (^1, A2) be an adversary. For atk G {cpa, ccal, cca2} and A: G N 
let 
y ^pk{^b)' = b - 1 
where 
Ifatk = cpa then = s and ^2(0 = s 
If atk = ccal then = ^sk(-) and <̂ 2(0 = s 
If atk = cca2 then 0\{') = TskCO and 02{-) = ^sk(-) 
It is insisted that A\ outputs xo, x\ with |xo| = |xi|. In the case of CCA2, it also insisted 
that A2 does not ask its oracle to decrypt y. We say that 77 is secure in the sense of 
ESfD-ATK if A being polynomial-time implies that Adv^J^^^^O is negligible. | 
2.7.4 Non-Malleability 
The goal non-malleability (NM) is not to ensure that no information about the 
message x can be recovered from the ciphertext (as in IND), but to ensure that an 
adversary cannot create a ciphertext whose decryption is "meaningfully related" to the 
decrypted challenge ciphertext. The idea of "meaningfully related" is achieved 
through some mathematical relation R(x, x% 
We will not give the definition of [3] here, as this paper shows that NM is related to 
IND, and at least in the sense of CCA2 the two are equivalent. It should be noted that 
IND and NM are proved equivalent based on the definition of NM from [3], but also 
their definition implies a previous definitions fi^om [19]. 
2.7.5 Relationships between Notions 
Figure 2 shows the relationships between the notions of security as given in [3]. The 
arrows are implications and the hatched arrows represent separations which [3] 
actually prove. The reader is directed to their paper for the corresponding proofs. 
NM-CPA NM-CCAl NM-CCA2 • 
t 
IND-CCA2 
These relations now allow us to only require a proof of security in the sense of IND-
CCA2 (if that is our goal) and be sure that weaker, or equivalent, notions of security 
are achieved. 
2.7.6 Notions of Security for Signature Schemes 
As with encryption schemes there are notions of security for signature schemes. 
Again the notions of security are presented in terms of attacks and goals, however 
only informal definitions will be given as some of the notions are more difficult to 
capture than such simple tests such as ESiD. These definitions are fi'om [25]. 
The following are a list of attacks on a signature scheme in order of increasing 
severity. Here A denotes the user whose signature method is being attacked. 
• Known-message attack (KMA). The enemy is given access to a set of signatures 
for a set of messages mi, ..., The messages are known to the enemy but are 
not chosen by him. 
• Generic chosen-message attack. The enemy is allowed to obtain from A valid 
signatures for a chosen hst of message mi, ..., before he attempts to break A's 
signature scheme. The messages are chosen by the enemy before he sees A's 
public key and hence this attack is "generic" as it is independent of yi's public key. 
• Directed chosen-message attack. Similar to the generic chosen-message attack, 
but now the enemy is allowed access to ^ ' s pubhc key before choosing a Ust of 
messages. This attack is still non-adaptive and is "directed" against a particular 
user, A. 
• Adaptive chosen-message attack (CMA). The enemy is allowed to use as an 
"oracle", to obtain signatures for messages that may depend on yl's pubhc key and 
on previously obtained signatures. 
Next the goals of the attacker are given, these are the way in which the adversary 
would like to break the signature scheme. Goals are listed in order of decreasing 
severity. 
• A total break. Compute ̂ ' s secret trap-door information. 
• Universal forgery. Find an efficient signing algorithm functionally equivalent to 
A's signing algorithm (based on possibly different but equivalent trap-door 
information). 
• Selective forgery. Forge a signature for a particular message chosen a priori by 
the enemy. 
• Existential forgery. Forge a signature for at least one message. The enemy has no 
control over the message whose signature he obtains, so it may be random or 
nonsensical. Consequentially this forgery may only be a minor nuisance to A. 
The goal for any signature scheme is to be secure in the sense of existential forgery, 
that is the scheme should be 'not existentially forgeable' (NEF), against an adaptively 
chosen-message attack (NEF-CMA). 
2.8 Plaintext Awareness 
Plaintext Awareness (PA) was first defined in [4], but the definition was extended and 
developed in [3] so their definition shall be used. PA for an encryption scheme is a 
simple concept to fulfil: an adversary is unable to create a ciphertext without knowing 
the underlying plaintext. Currently the definition of PA only exists in the Random 
Oracle (RO) model. 
The RO model assumes everyone has access to a public oracle that outputs perfectly 
random information. Li reality, hash functions and PRNG are used. The RO model is 
discussed in [5] with a counter argument in [13]. 
The definition uses the following notation. By {C,y) <— run B {pk^ we mean the 
following. Run B on input pk and oracle Spk- Form into a hst C=(yi,y2, ..., ygg) the 
answers (ciphertexts) received as a result of ^^^rqueries. (The messages that formed 
the actual queries are not recorded.) Finally, record b's output, 
Definition 7 - {PA) Let 77 = {X, 5, V) be an encryption scheme, let ^ be an 
adversary, and let K be an algorithm (the "knowledge extractor"). For any A: G N let 
?r[H ^ Hash; {pk, sk) <r- K (l^); 
{hH, C, y) r u n { p k ) : K{hH, C , p k ) - D J (;;)] 
We insist y ^ C\ that is, B never outputs a string y which coincides with the value 
returned fi"om some 5"pk-query. We say that ^ is a 2(A:)-extractor if K has running 
time polynomial in the length of its inputs and for every adversary B, 
{k)>X{k). 
We say that 77 is secure in the sense of PA if 77 is secure in the 
sense of IND-CPA and there exists a /l(A:)-extractor ̂  where 1 - X{k) is negligible. | 
The purpose of the knowledge extractor is to simulate the decryption oracle, except 
without access to a private key. If the knowledge extractor succeeds at recovenng the 
plaintext from a challenge ciphertext provided by the adversary, then this means the 
adversary must know the plaintext as it can be recovered from just examining oracle 
queries and the public key. 
The main point of showing that an encryption scheme is PA is the following theorem. 
Theorem 9 - [PA =>IND-CCA2] If encryption scheme His secure in the sense of PA 
then it is secure in the RO sense of IND-CCA2.1 
This gives a very useful method for showing an encryption scheme is secure in the 
sense of IND-CCA2, it just needs to be shown it is secure in the sense of IND-CPA 
and define a knowledge extractor for it, thus complying with the definition of PA. 
C H A P T E R 3 REVIEW 
When contributing to an area of knowledge it is essential to know and appreciate the 
work that has already been done. This chapter does this by highlighting important 
contributions, which lay out the development of provably secure cryptosystems. 
3.1 Timeline 
• 1979 
- Rabin [54] - Devised CPA scheme that is equivalent to factoring, but is 
insecure against CCAl attack. This lead to the belief in a "paradox" - any 
scheme whose security broke down to finding the private key from the public 
key could not be secure against CCAl. 
• 1984 
- Goldwasser, Micali, Rivest [26] - They showed the paradox false by creating 
the first signature scheme secure against a CMA attack. The result held for 
encryption schemes as well. 
- Goldwasser, Micali [27] - They define notions of probabilistic encryption, 
indistinguishability of encryptions (IND) and semantic security, and show the 
equivalence between them. 
• 1988 
- Blum, Feldman, Micali [9] - Using non-interactive zero-knowledge proofs 
they show how security in the sense of CCAl can be achieved. 
• 1990 
- Naor, Yung [49] - The first cryptosystem secure against CCAl, but 
encryption is bit-by-bit and has massive ciphertext expansion. 
• 1991 
- Damagard [16] - Designs a secure scheme against CCAl, and practical, but 
later discovered insecure against CCA2. 
- Rackoff, Simon [55] - Defined the adaptively chosen ciphertext attack (they 
didn't call it this though). 
- Dolev, Dwork, Naor [19] - Defined non-malleable (NM) cryptography. 
• 1993 
- Zheng-Seberry [70] - Claimed security against chosen ciphertext attack 
(CCA2), but not in emerging model on security (IND). 
- Bellare, Rogaway [5] - Use the random oracle model to create a secure 
scheme in CCA2 sense. 
• 1995 
- Bellare, Rogaway [4] - They develop OAE, which is secure against CCA2 but 
uses the random oracle model. OAE can use any one-way trapdoor 
permutation (eg RSA). They develop the notion of plaintext awareness (PA) 
• 1997 
- Zheng [68] - Creates the idea of Signcryption. 
• 1998 
- Bellare, Desai, Pointcheval, Rogaway [3] - Seminal paper that specifies the 
relations among the notions of security. They show IND-CCA2 = NM-CCA2 
and many other implications. Results true in standard model and RO. They 
also refine the PA definition. 
- Cramer, Shoup [15] - The first practical and provably secure scheme in CCA2 
sense under only standard assumptions. 
• 2000 
- Pointcheval [52] - Develops method for creating a scheme provable secure in 
CCA2 sense from any trapdoor one-way function in RO model. 
Cryptographic schemes that are provably secure are increasingly becoming the norm 
nowadays, hence the review given here will be of those schemes that are provably 
secure, at least imder some assumptions. Zheng-Seberry has also been added to this 
Hst, even though it is not provably secure, however it was an integral stepping stone in 
this research. There are absences from this review, such as a scheme by Fujisaki and 
Okamoto [24], this has been done solely for reasons of conciseness. 
3.1.1 Naor and Yung 
A review of provably secure schemes could start as far back as Rabin's scheme in 
1979, but a base security standard of CCAl will be set. Naor and Yung were the first 
to devise a scheme that was secure against CCAl; their scheme was actually built 
upon any bit encryption scheme secure in the CPA sense. 
Naor-Yung 
Preliminaries 
A PKC triple 5, with ^ the key generator, S an encryption algorithm that 
encrypts bits and t> a decryption algorithm. 
A non-interactive zero-knowledge proof (NIZKP) system triple % where P 
and ^ are two parties, one to prove membership and one to verify, and ^ is a 
distribution. 
Key Generation 
^ on input« € N is run twice to produce two sets of public and private keys {^ru ym) 
Generate/? 
Public key is {yRi, yR2, R) and private key is (xri, xr2). 
Encryption 
To encrypt a message m = b],b2,bk 
For each \<i<k 
1) Generate r. {0,!}"<"> (p(„) a polynomial in n) 
2) Compute 
3) Run p on c/ with witness , r.^) and string R to get pi 
The encrypted message is j a , p i \ fe, p i ) , . . f a , Pk\ 
Decryption 
For each \<i<k 
1) Verify that c, is consistent by running the verifier^ on c/, pi, R 
2) If accepts, then retrieve bi by computing either or 
' ̂ h )) • Otherwise the output is null. 
This scheme, while theoretically sound, would never be used in practice as the 
ciphertext expansion is enormous. If the output of encryption scheme was of size q 
(say the underlying group) then the ciphertext would be of size Ikq + \p\. Naor-Yung 
suggest an encryption scheme from [27] based on quadratic residues, now if the size 
of the underlying group was 512 bits, and we wanted to send a message of 1 kilobyte, 
then the ciphertext would be >1 Megabyte! 
The proof for this scheme requires knowledge of NIZKP's and since this is the only 
scheme that requires such knowledge, the reader is referred to Naor-Yung's paper 
[49] for the proof 
3.1.2 Damagard 
Damagard was the first to come up with an encryption scheme that was provably 
secure against CCAl (under some reasonable assumptions) and was very practical. 
However, Zheng-Seberry was to later show that Damagard's scheme was completely 
insecure against CCA2. 
Damagard actually devised two schemes, one deterministic and loosely based on 
Rabin's scheme and the other probabilistic and based on the EL-Gamal/Diffie-Hellman 
scheme. Only the latter scheme is given here. 
Damagard 
Preliminaries 
Working modulo a large prime p, with generator g. 
Key Generation 
Generate two secret keys XRI, XR2 e GF(p) 
Generate two public keys ŷ ^̂  = modp,yR2 = inodp 
Encryption 
Choose r gr GF(/7), encrypt message m 




Like Damagard, Zheng-Seberry developed schemes that they considered not only 
secure but also practical. They extended Damagard's work by highlighting the point 
that although security against CCAl seemed sound Damagard's scheme was 
completely insecure against CCA2. Zheng-Seberry showed that by taking the 
parameter cj = w © / , a random message m'and calculating C3'=m'@ cs, then by 
passing (cy, C2, C3 ) to the decryption oracle, it would return m © w 'from which m can 
easily be found. 
Zheng-Seberry then went on to describe a scheme they considered secure against 
CCA2, and presented a proof of security based on some reasonable assumptions. 
They actually presented three schemes, two very similar except one used a one-way 
hash function and the other universal one-way hash functions, whilst the third 




Consider messages of length a one-way hash function H with output length ko and a 
PRNG G with output length n + ko. Operations are modulo p and there is a generator g-
Key Generation 
Private key is XR G GF(/7) and public key is y^ = g""" mod p 
Encryption 
Encrypt message m 
1) xgr[1,;7-1] 
2) ^ = 
3) t = n{m) 
4) c i = g ' 
5) C2 = ze(mHt) 
Ciphertext is (c;, C2) 
Decryption 
1) = 
2) W = z ' e c 2 
3) m = W[i...„] 
5) if H(m) = rthen output m else output 0 
Unfortunately the proof of security for this scheme doesn't use what has become the 
standard notions of security, security against IND or NM. The Zheng-Seberry paper 
is discussed in more detail in 0. 
3.1.4 Bellare and Rogaway - OAE 
Bellare and Rogaway develop Optimal Asymmetric Encryption (OAE) as the answer 
to finding a practical yet provably secure encryption scheme. However, the proof of 
security relies on the use of the Random Oracle (RO) model, which states that instead 
of having real hash functions or PRNG, perfect random oracles exist. At first this 
may seem to provide no guarantees at all, but Bellare and Rogaway present 
convincing arguments as to the usefulness of using this model, not the least of which 
is that it yields extremely practical schemes with ahnost provable security. 
The scheme they develop is based on the use of any trapdoor permutation (of which 
RSA is the best known), making their scheme very general. The scheme outlined here 
was to later become part of the PKCS #1 v2.1: RSA Cryptography Standard (1999). 
Although see [8] for an attack. 
OAE (Bellare-Rogaway) 
Preliminaries 
A k-bit trapdoor permutation and its inverse Messages are of length n, and a 
random number of length ko, so that k = n +kg. Two random oracles, H taking strings 
of length n to strings of length ko, and G taking strings of length ko to strings of length 
n. 
Key Generation 
As appropriate for the chosen permutation/ 
Encryption 
To encrypt a message m 
1 ) Choose random r of length ko 
2) 5 = m e G ( r ) 
3) i = r e H ( 5 ) 
4) w = s \ \ i 
5) y = A ^ ) 
Ciphertext is y  
Decryption 
1) w ^ ( y ) 
2) S = Wi,.n 
3) i = "̂ „.L̂ n̂ ko 
4) r = i eH(5 ) 5) m = 5 e G ( r ) 
Bellare and Rogaway also presented an even more ambitious scheme similar to the 
one above, but this time secure in the sense of PA. Their PA scheme is virtually the 
same as the one above except that n = k - ko, becomes n = k - ko - k\ and m is 
replaced with mO '̂, where is a string of k\ zeroes. Then during decryption mO '̂ 
is recovered and if the last k\ bits are checked to be the string of zeroes, the output is 
the message, otherwise 0 . 
3.1 .5 Zheng 
As hinted at in the Zheng-Seberry paper a digital signature can be incorporated into an 
encryption scheme, Zheng formalises this idea by introducing the concept of 
'signcryption'. The idea is basically to merge confidentiality and authentication in 
one scheme such that it performs better than when confidentiality and authentication 
are performed separately (see Chapter 5). Zheng's scheme involves the use of keyed 
hashing and a private key cipher, it is outlined below. 
Zheng 
Preliminaries 
Use GF(/7) with large prime factor q and generator g of order q. Need a keyed 
hashing algorithm KH and a private key encryption cipher E and decryption cipher D. 
Key Generation 
Private key of sender is jĉ  e GF(p) and public key is ys = g""' mod/?. Private key of 
receiver is xr G GF(p) and public key is yR^g""" mod p. 
Signcryption 
To signcrypt a message m 
1) Choosejc 6 r [1...^] 
2) k^yR mo^p 
3) Split k into ki and k2 of appropriate length 
4) r = KH,Xm) 
5) + 
(alternatively 5 = a: / (1 + rxs) mod q ) 
6) c = 
Signcrypted-text is (c, r, s) 
Unsigncryption 
1) k = 
(alternatively A: = 
2) Split k into k\ and k2 
3) m = D,Xc) 
4) Accept m 'li r = KH,^^ (m) else output 0 
Zheng does not provide a formal proof for this scheme, but the scheme is included in 
this review as it is the first paper to deal with this concept and hence very relevant to 
this thesis. In fact Zheng did not even base his arguments for security in terms of 
formal notions of security, one of the major goals of this thesis is to provide formal 
notions of security for signcryption (Chapter 5). 
Note, if the output of KH is of size \q\, then the ciphertext has size 2\q\ + |p|, and 
overall there are 4 operations (not including symmetric key cipher calls). 
3.1.6 Cramer-Shoup 
Cramer-Shoup were the first to create a practical scheme that was provably secure in 
the sense of IND-CCA2 under standard assumptions (not using the RO model). The 
scheme is practical although not as practical as schemes based on the RO model, like 
OAE. However, the promise of provable security would out-way the benefits of 
better efficiency for many applications. 
The proof of Cramer-Shoup is very strong, it assumes there is an adversary that can 
break the scheme, and then describes how to construct a simulator that uses the 
adversary to create a statistical test for the Diffie-Hellman decision problem. The 
proof is strong as it holds true even if the adversary is powerful (not to be confused 
with the scheme being secure against a powerful adversary). 
Cramer-Shoup 
Preliminaries 
Group G of prime order q, where q is large. Also need a universal one-way hash 
function H. 
Key Generation 
Choose randomly x\, X2, yu yi, z g r Z^ which constitute the private key. Choose 
randomly two elements gu g2 gr G, then calculate c = g^'gl', d = g^'gl' ,h = gl, 
then pubHc key is (gu gi, c, d, h). 
Encryption 
Encrypt a message m 
1) Randomly choose r eZg 
2) Ui=gi\u2=g2 
3) e = h'm 
4) a=U(uuU2,e) 
5) v^c'-if" 
Ciphertext (u\, U2, e, v) 
Decryption 
1) a = li{uuU2,e) 
2) If ^ v then 
e output m = — 
«r 
else output 0 
3 . 1 . 7 P o i n t c h e v a l 
OAE was a generic construction of an IND-CCA2 secure scheme from any one-way 
permutation, however there are just not that many one-way permutations. Pointcheval 
showed a generic construction for an IND-CCA2 secure scheme based on any 
partially trapdoor one-way function, of which many exist. As with OAE, the proofs 
are only valid in the RO model. 
Pointcheval 
Preliminaries 
A partially trapdoor one-way function / , and another function that partially inverts it 
g. Work over a group appropriate for the function. A hash flmction H and PRNG G. 
Key Generation 
As appropriate fo r / 
Encryption 
Encrypt a message m 
1) Randomly choose r and s of appropriate size 
2) a=y(r,H(m||5) 
3) ^ = (/M||j) e G(r) 
Ciphertext is {a, b) 
Decryption 
1) r = g{a) 
2) M=b@G{r) 
3) Ifa=y(r,H(A^)then 
else output 0 
3.2 Signature Schemes 
Some signature schemes are presented here that are considered secure and have the 
advantage that the signature they generate is small. 
3.2.1 Schnorr 
Developed by Schnorr [58] in 1989 as a result of an identification protocol, and is 
more secure than the original El-Gamal signature scheme. 
Schnorr 
Preliminaries 
Working over GF(p) with q being a large prime factor p - 1. Also need a generator g 
of order q. A hash function H. 
Key Generation 
Choose a random private key xs g [l---^] and then calculate public key 
= modj!?. 
Signature 
Sign a message m 
1) Randomly choose r e [1.. 
2) x = g^mo&p 
3) e = H(x, m) 
4) Calculate y = r + xse mod q 
Signature is (e, y) 
Verification 
1) x' = g'ylmodp 
2) If e = H(x', m) then output true else output false. 
3.2.2 Digital Signature Standard (DSS) 
Developed by NIST (National Listitute of Standards and Technology) [51] in 1994 for 




A prime modulus, p, where < p iox 512 < L < 1024 and L a multiple of 64. 
Also, q, a prime divisor o i p - \ , where < q < A generator g = h^~ ^̂^̂  mod 
p, where h is an integer l<h<pmdg>l. A hash function H (standard recommends 
SHA-1). 
Key Generation 
Randomly choose a secret key where 0 < jĉ  < Calculate the public key 
mod p. 
Signature 
Sign message m 
1) Choose random k e [l...q] 
2) ^ = fe^ mod/?) mod ^ 
3) s = k'\ll(m) + xsr) mod q 
Signature (r, s) 
Verification 
1) W = 
2) Ml = H(m).w mod q 
3) U2 = r.w mod q 
4) V = mod^)mod p 
5) If V = r then output true else output false. 
3.2.3 Pointcheval-Stern Modified El-Gamal 
Pointcheval and Stem [53] present a method for proving the security of signature 
schemes in the RO model. They apply their method to a modified version of El-
Gamal and prove its security against existential forgery for an adaptively chosen 
message attacker, in the RO model. 
Modified El-Gamal 
Preliminaries 
Work over GF(p) where p is sl large prime with q a large prime factor of - 1. Need 
a generator g of order q and hash function H. 
Key Generation 
Choose a random private key g [1...^] and then calculate public key 
modp. 
Signature 
Sign a message m 
1) Choose random k e [ 1... 
2) r = g^modq 
3) Solve H(m, r) =xsr + ks mod q for s 
Signature (r, H(m, r), s) 
Verification 
1) If - y'̂ ŝ ' mod ̂  the output true else output false 

C H A P T E R 4 ZHENG-SEBERRY 
The Zheng-Seberry (ZS) [70] encryption scheme was pubhshed in 1993 and was one 
of the first practical schemes that was considered secure against a CCA2 adversary. 
This chapter shows for the first time that a version of the ZS scheme is actually 
insecure against a CCA2 adversary. The ZS scheme is then modified to make it into a 
provably secure cryptosystem. 
4 . 1 R e v i e w 
The ZS paper presented three variants of an El-Gamal like cryptosystem. The three 
variants were described as 'immunising' the cryptosystem against a CCA2 adversary. 
The variants incorporated a one-way hash function (OWH), a universal hash function 
(UHF) and a digital signature (SIG). These variants are given below. 
4 . 1 . 1 ZS-OWH 
ZS-OWH 
Preliminaries 
Consider messages of length a one-way hash function H with output length ko and a 
PRNG G with output length n + ko. Operations are modulo p and there is a generator 
Ml Key Generation 
Private key is xr G GF(p) and pubHc key is yj^ = g""" mod p 
Encryption 
Encrypt message m 
1) ;cgr[1,;7-1] 
2) ^ = 
3) i = H(m) 
4) 
5) C2=z@im\\t) 
Ciphertext is (ci, C2) 
Decryption 
1) 
2) W = z ' e c 2 
3) m = W[i...„] 
4) = 
If H(m) = ^^then output m else output 0 
4.1 .2 ZS-UHF 
ZS-UHF 
Preliminaries 
Consider messages of length n, a (strong) universal hash function Hg that is indexed 
by a string of length ko and a PRNG G with output length n + h. Operations are 
modulo p and there is a generator g. 
Key Generation 
Private key is XR G GF(/7) and public key is y= g""" mod p 
Encryption 
Encrypt message m 
1) xGK[hp- l ] 
2) r = yi 
3) z = 
4) = 
5) 
6) C2 = Hs(m) 
7) C3=z@ m 




3) 5' = 
4) m=z'®C3 
IfRspn) = C2 then output m else output 0 
4.1 .3 ZS-SIG 
ZS-SIG 
Preliminaries 
Consider messages of length a one-way hash function H with output length ko and a 
PRNG G with output length n + ko. Operations are modulo p and there is a generator 
El Key Generation 
Private key is XK g GF(p) and public key is mod p . 
Encryption 
Encrypt message m 
1) 
3) r = 
4) ^ = 
5) 
6) C2=g' 
7) C3 = (H(m) - xryk mod (p-l) 
8) C4 = z ® m 




3) m=z '®C4 
If = d'cl' then output m else output 0 
4.1.4 Original Zheng-Seberry Proof 
An economised version of the proof by ZS will be given, however the proof for ZS-
SIG will be ignored, as this requires extra assumptions. 
The proof relies on the intractability of the Diffie-Hellman Problem (DHP) [18] (or 
computational Diffie-Hellman problem (CDHP)), defined below. 
Definition 8 - (DHP) Given >̂ 1, y2, g and p, where y^ = g""' and y^ = g""^ for some x\ 
and X2 chosen randomly and independently from [1 . . . / ? - 1], calculate y = g''''''. | 
The DHP is assumed computationally infeasible for any probabilistic polynomial time 
algorithm. The DHP is related to the DLP in that if one could solve the DLP then one 
could also solve the DHP, but the reverse result is unknown. 
First the security against a CPA attacker will be shown. This is achieved by showing 
that no partial information about the message is leaked. For ZS-OWH consider that 
the message m is hidden by z and z = where g^ and g""" are public. Then by an 
argument similar to [10], given z and z\ (a truly random string), if the CDHP is 
intractable then no probabilistic polynomial time algorithm can distinguish z from z\. 
For ZS-UHF, consider that if z and s are truly random strings then neither z © m or 
Hj(w) reveal any partial information, and if z and s are independent then z ® m and 
Hj(m) together, reveal no partial information. When z and s are the output of a 
pseudo-random number generator, to a probabilistic polynomial time algorithm they 
look like random strings and hence no partial information about m is leaked. 
The ZS paper gives these informal proofs and states that they can easily be translated 
into formal proofs. 
ZS then consider security against a CCA2 adversary. A new notion called "sole-
samplable" is introduced, to describe the space induced by an encryption function. 
The idea is akin to the notion of a "knowledge extractor" from the definition of PA 
(see section 2.8). Intuitively, when a function induces a space that is sole-samplable, 
the only way to generate an element in that space is to start with an element of the 
functions pre-image. This notion is formally defined and involves a polynomial 
Turing machine ^ called the pre-image extractor, that with access to some relevant 
information, can find a pre-image with non-negligible probability. 
The assumption is made that ZS-OWH and ZS-UHF induce a sole-samplable space. 
The proof shows that for an encryption system that is secure against a CPA adversary 
and induces a sole-samplable space, any CCA2 adversary can be completely 
simulated by a CPA adversary. But since by hypothesis the scheme is secure against 
a CPA adversary, it must also be secure against a CCA2 adversary. 
4.2 Breaking ZS-OWH in IND-CCA2 Sense 
"Due to the involvement of t = H(m), the creation of the ciphertext is 
apparently impossible without the knowledge of x and m. ... This 
motivates us to introduce a notion called sole-samplable spaced [70, pg. 
721] 
If this author had to pick an assumption in the ZS paper that ultimately turned out to 
be incorrect, the above assumption would be an appropriate choice. As it turns out an 
adversary can create a new ciphertext from an existing ciphertext, if the message in 
the existing ciphertext is known. This credit for this attack should be shared equally 
between the author and Assoc. Prof Josef Pieprzyk, as it was discovered by the 
author during discussions with Assoc. Prof Pieprzyk. 
To see how this is achieved consider the last part of the ciphertext, C2=z® {m\\t)^z 
© {m II H(m)). It just depends on the message, so if the message is known, this part of 
the ciphertext can be recreated. If the adversary wishes to replace the message m with 
another message m', this can be achieved via: 
C2' = C2@{m II H(m)) © {m' || H(m')) 
= z © (m II H(m)) © (m || H(m)) © (m' || H(m')) 
= z © [(m II H(w)) © {m II H(w))] © {m' || H(m')) (expression in [] is 0) 
= z©(m' | | H(w)) 
The new ciphertext is {c\, c-i) and the adversary is successful in manipulating the 
cryptosystem. 
This attack can be used by a CCA2 adversary to defeat IND and the adversary 
succeeds 100% of the time. In this situation the adversary does not know which of 
two messages, mo or mi, has been encrypted, but they know one of them has been. 
Let the encrypted message be rrib where b e [0,1]. The adversary uses the above 
attack by setting m = mo and m' = m\ and creates a new cryptogram via: 
C2' = C2 © ( mo II H(mo) ) © ( mi || H(mi) ) 
= z © ( mb II H(mb) ) © ( mo II H(mo) ) © ( mi || H(mi) ) Then either (if b = 0) 
= z e [( mb II H(mb) ) e ( mo II H(mo) )] 0 ( mi || H(mi) ) Or (if b = 1) 
= z e [( mb II H(mb) ) e ( mi II H(mi) )] 0 ( mo || H(mo) ) Then 
= ze(m-.b| |H(m^b)) 
Hence the adversary creates a new ciphertext (cu cj'X which is a valid ciphertext for 
the message that was not encrypted in the challenge ciphertext. Since the adversary is 
a CCA2 adversary, and the new ciphertext is not the challenge ciphertext, they may 
query the decryption oracle with it. The decryption oracle will dutifully return the 
message that was not encrypted, m_,b, and the adversary makes their choice for b as 
corresponding to the message not returned by the decryption oracle. 
The ZS-OWH scheme is largely of theoretical value to the cryptographic community, 
so while breaking the scheme does not have many practical impUcations, it is still of 
theoretical use. This break highlights the importance of adding probabilistic 
redundancy to the ciphertext, which can be verified on decryption. Also, as recently 
as EUROCRYPT 2000, a paper [60] made reference to the ZS paper with the 
imphcation being it was secure, under some assumptions. So this attack against ZS-
OWH is indeed a new result. 
This attack on ZS-OWH is not very complex, and as could be expected a minor 
change to the scheme thwarts the attack. 
ZS-OWH 
Preliminaries 
Consider messages of length n, a one-way hash function H with output length kg and a 
PRNG G with output length n + ko. Operations are modulo p and there is a generator 
El Key Generation 
Private key is XR g GF(p) and public key is yj^ = g""" mod p 
Encryption 
Encrypt message m 
1) XG^[l,p-l] 
2) r = yl 
3) z = 
4) t = Yi{m\\r) 
5) 
6) C2 = ze (m | | 0 
Ciphertext is {c\, C2) 
Decryption 
1) = 
2) z = 
3) W = z ' e c 2 
4) 
5) = v-fco)] 
If H(m llr") = ^^then output m ^else output 0 
The change incorporates some randomness into the hash calculation and thus defeats 
the above attack as the adversary can no longer create the concatenation of message 
and hash because the adversary does not know the source of randomness. This 
change defeats the above attack, but of course does not prove the security of the 
scheme. 
This change was borrowed from a authenticated-encryption version of ZS-OWH by 
Zheng [69], however Zheng stresses that the changes made are only needed for the 
new scheme proposed and that the original scheme is secure. 
4.3 Secure El-Gamal 
The attack and the repair of the original ZS-OWH leaves a rather large question mark 
over its security. Securing the original ZS-OWH scheme led to a new El-Gamal 
variant. Great efforts were made to prove the security of this new variant using the 
CS proof and thus derive a scheme that was secure under some reasonable 
assumptions, but without using the RO model. Unfortunately, this goal was not 
realised, but encouragingly the proof does not heavily rely on the RO model. 
4.3.1 Construction of Proof for Secure El-Gamal 
The construction of the proof for Secure El-Gamal is very similar to the Cramer-
Shoup proof Knowledge of the Cramer-Shoup proof would help in understanding the 
construction of this proof, readers can see [15]. 
The proof relies on the difficulty of the Decision Diffie-Helhnan Problem (DDHP), 
the definition of which, from Cramer-Shoup, is given below. 
Definition 9 - [15, pg. 16] Let G be a group of large prime order q, and consider the 
following two distributions: 
- the distribution R of random quadruples (gi, g2, wi, ui) g G ;̂ 
- the distribution D of quadruples (gi, gi, mi, ui) e ( j , where g\, g2 are 
random, and ui = gi^ and U2 = gi for random r G Z^. 
An algorithm that solves the DDHP is a statistical test that can effectively distinguish 
these two distributions. | 
The construction of the proof is as follows. It is assumed an adversary that can break 
the cryptosystem in the IND-CCA2 sense exists, and then it is shown how this 
adversary can unwittingly be used to help solve what is considered a computationally 
unfeasible problem, in this case the DDHP. The construction of the proof can be seen 
in Figure 3. 
The input to the proof are quadruples coming from either D or R (but not both). 
These go to a constructed simulator, which is responsible for, the creation of keys, 
simulation of an encryption oracle and simulation of a decryption oracle. The IND-
CCA2 adversary receives all its information, including oracle queries, from the 
• simulator. 
The proof runs as follows. A quadruple is input, the simulator creates a valid secret 
key (once only), and creates the public key, which is passed to the IND-CCA2 
adversary. The adversary runs its first stage Au and passes to the simulated 
encryption oracle two messages, mo and mi, the simulated encryption oracle chooses a 
random bit b G [0, 1], encrypts nib and passes the challenge ciphertext back to the 
adversary. The adversary cannot see the simulator's choice for b. 
The adversary then runs its second stage, A2, on the challenge ciphertext and outputs 
its guess, b\ for the random bit. Both the simulator and the adversary pass b and b' 
respectively to a distinguisher that outputs \\ib = b' otherwise 0. 
Consider the case when the input comes from R, the simulator is unable to create a 
valid ciphertext (as the relation that quadruples from D have, are not present in 
quadruples from R). This fact will be crucial in showing the adversary cannot 
succeed in guessing b with any advantage. Alternatively, when the input comes from 
D, then the simulator creates a perfectly valid ciphertext and the adversary can guess 
the bit b with an advantage. 
Input from D or R. 
Figure 3 - Graphical representation for the construction of the Secure El-Gamal 
proof 
Hence by observing the distribution of O's and 1 's that are output by the distinguisher, 
it can be determined which distribution the quadruples are coming from. If the 
quadruples are coming from R then I's will occur with probability 0.5 and O's with 
probability 0.5. The adversary will only be correct half the time, as it has no 
advantage. If the quadruples come from D then the adversary has an advantage and 
I 's will occur with probability 0.5 + s (where s is the adversary's non-neghgible 
advantage) and O's with probability 0.5 - s. 
Hence, by observation of the output distribution, one has a statistical test for the 
DDHP. 
The construction of the proof is relatively simple, however there are several properties 
that must hold for the proof to be valid. 
• The simulator must create a valid ciphertext if the quadruple comes from D and an 
invalid ciphertext if the quadruple comes from R. 
• When the quadruple comes from D the joint distribution of the adversary's view 
and the random bit b must be statistically indistinguishable from that in an actual 
attack 
• When the quadruple comes from R the distribution of the random bit b must be 
(essentially) independent from the adversary's view. 
4.3.2 Proof of Security for Secure El-Gamal 
First the scheme is presented. 
Secure El-Gamal 
Preliminaries 
Consider messages of length n - ko, a random oracle H with output length kg. 
Operations are modulo p where p = 2q+ I (q is prime) and a generator gi of order q. 
Key Generation 
Private key is xr e GF(p) and pubhc key is yj^ = g""" mod p. 
Encryption 
Encrypt message m 
1) XGr[1,/7-1] 
2) ^ = 
3) i = H(m||r) 
4) 
5) C3 = r- {m\\tf 
Ciphertext is (ci, cj) 
Decryption 
1) = 
2) >v = — (choose the square root that yields the correct hash) r 
3) = 
4) = 
If H(m II f ) = ^^then output m else output 0 
The differences between this and the original El-Gamal scheme is the addition of the 
hash appended to the message, and the squaring of the message and hash to convert 
them into a quadratic residue (this makes it an element of the quadratic residues of 
GF(p), the group of order q). Note that in step 2 of the decryption, if neither square 
root yields a correct hash then the output is 0 . 
The following proof is 100% the work of the author, although rejection of previous 
version and verification of this version was done with significant help fi-om Dr David 
Pointcheval. 
Theorem 10 - Secure El-Gamal is secure against adaptive chosen ciphertext attack 
in the Random Oracle model assuming that the Diffie-Hellman decision problem is 
hard in the group GF(p). 
The proof of security is for a scheme that is shght variant of the El-Gamal scheme 
described above, but the two schemes are interchangeable. The scheme used in the 
proof has an extra part to the ciphertext, cj. A ciphertext from the El-Gamal scheme 
(above) can be transformed into one for this scheme (in the proof) by (ci, C3) (ci, 
C2, C3-C2). The transformation back is obvious. 
First the simulator is described. On input the quadruple (gu gi, cu C2) the simulator 
generates a random private key XR GR GF(p) and outputs the public key as 
yj, mod p. 
The simulator simulates the encryption oracle as follows. On input two messages mo 
and mi it selects a random bit G [0, 1] and computes: 
r = c^' 
C3 = (r' C2) '(mtW }i(mt || r) f 
The simulated encryption oracle outputs (ci, C2, C3), where ci and C2 come from the 
input quadruple to the simulator. 
The simulator simulates the decryption oracle as follows. On input (ci, C2, C3) it 
computes: 
r = c^' 
w = V(c5 / (r • C2)) (choose the square root that yields the correct hash) 
If H{m II r) = simulated decryption oracle outputs m, else it outputs 0 . 
The aim now is to show that when the input comes from D the simulator simulates the 
encryption and decryption oracles perfectly (probabilistically) and the advantage of 
the adversary is apparent at the distinguisher. Alternatively, if the input comes from 
R then the output of the simulated encryption oracle will not be a vahd ciphertext in 
the sense that loĝ ^ Cj ^̂  loĝ ^ C2. 
It is also important to note that since the DDHP is hard for the adversary they cannot 
even find out any partial information about the secret key that could be used to 
determine b. 
The theorem follows from the following two lemmas. 
Lemma 1 - When the simulator's input comes from D, the joint distribution of the 
adversary's view and the hidden bit b is statistically indistinguishable from that in the 
actuxil attack. 
In this case it is clear the output of the simulated encryption oracle has the right form 
as cf^ C2 = ( g f g l = (gi''' y g^ = y ig l which is equivalent to the output of the actual 
encryption oracle. Similarly, the simulated decryption oracle will accept all valid 
ciphertexts. 
It remains to be shown that all invalid ciphertexts are rejected with overwhelming 
probability. If an invalid ciphertext (in the sense that loĝ ^ ĉ  ^ log^^ C2) is presented 
as a query to the decryption oracle it will be rejected as the resulting r will not be 
correct for recovering m from C3. More importantly the invalid ciphertext will not 
pass the check involving the random oracle (H). By using a random oracle it is 
ensured that the hash is completely non-malleable and no partial information is 
leaked. 
Lemma 2 - When the simulator's input comes from R, the distribution of the hidden 
bit is (essentially) independent from the adversary's view. 
First it will be shown that no partial information about b is leaked from just the 
challenge ciphertext, this essentially is showing IND-CPA security. Then it will be 
shown that there is only a negligible chance that the simulated decryption oracle gives 
the adversary any information about b. Since an IND-CCA2 adversary that caimot 
gain any information from a decryption oracle is equivalent to an IND-CPA 
adversary, the lemma is proven. 
It has been shown that assuming DDHP the El-Gamal cryptosystem is secure in the 
sense of IND-CPA [11, 64]. To show the IND-CPA security of this scheme it will be 
shown how to convert an El-Gamal challenge ciphertext into one for this scheme. 
First a second generator needs to be created, i f p is of the form p = 2q+ 1, then there 
are ^ - 1 generators. Hence by considering powers of gi a second generator of the 
form g2 = gi^ can be found in polynomial time, with w known. So gj^ can be 
calculated as (gi'')'̂ . So an El-Gamal challenge ciphertext can be transformed into a 
Secure El-Gamal challenge ciphertext as (gi\ yR.mb) (gi\ gi, (y / gi\m^. It 
should be noted that the message is a different size to a message in an actual Secure 
El-Gamal challenge ciphertext. However this is not an issue, if is an « bit prime, 
and the hash function outputs 128 bits, then the chances that two messages chosen at 
random do not differ in the first « - 128 bits is 1/2" ~ ^̂ ^ which is neghgible for 
suitable large n. The absence of the appended hash is irrelevant since the use of a 
random oracle ensures no information about m is leaked to an IND-CPA adversary. 
Also, without access to a decryption oracle there is no need for a correct hash value to 
be present in the ciphertext. 
The simulated decryption oracle still needs to reject all invalid ciphertexts, otherwise 
relevant information will be leaked. A valid ciphertext is (ci, C2, C3), an invalid one is 
(ci', ci'y C3'). There are two cases to consider. 
1) {ci) = (cs'). If this happens with non-negligible probability then the random oracle 
must not be one way since ci' and ci' will create a different r (as they are different 
from c\ and ci) and this will cause decryption to a different message and hash. If 
the hash check passes then the hash has been created without knowledge of the 
message. 
2) (cu C2) = (ci, C2). With C3 ^ C3', then the adversary has to replace the message 
and hash in C3 to create C3'. They can't just replace the message as if the hash 
check passes then a colHsion has been found. They can't replace the hash, or the 
message and hash, as without complete knowledge of r the correct hash cannot be 
calculated, and if it could then a collision could be found. 
Using a random oracle means that one-wayness and colhsion-freeness cannot be 
defeated, in fact no partial information is leaked about the pre-image of the hash. 
Thus, the simulated decryption oracle will reject all invalid ciphertexts, except with 
negligible probability. | 
Hence if the DDHP is a computationally unfeasible problem then an IND-CCA2 
attacker for Secure El-Gamal cannot exist. 
4.3.3 Comparison between CS and Secure El-Gamal 
It is immediately obvious that the CS scheme is more secure than Secure El-Gamal 
(remember all security is based on assumption, so using a phrase like 'more secure' 
just refers to the confidence we have in the assumptions that allow for security). This 
is because the CS scheme relies only on standard assumptions, and the Secure El-
Gamal scheme relies on the random oracle model, albeit in a minimal way. 
So what are the other differences between the two schemes? Well, the CS proof is 
certainly stronger as it requires weaker assumptions, but the Secure El-Gamal scheme 
is far more efficient. There is a trade-off here between the strength of proof, and 
efficiency. In many practical applications of public key cryptography the Secure El-
Gamal scheme would be the better choice due to its efficiency and good security. 
However it would not be the best choice, there exist schemes, like OAE [4], that are 
even more efficient. 
However, circumstances could exist where an application used the original El-Gamal 
(or a variant) and it was decided to change to a more secure scheme. In this case, it 
would be more efficient to change to Secure El-Gamal as there would be less 
overhead than a change to OAE. 
4.4 Elliptic Curve ZS 
Most cryptosystems that are variants of El-Gamal can be transformed into systems 
based on the ECDL problem. Here, for the first time, the ZS schemes that have been 
examined in this chapter will be transformed into their elliptic curve equivalents. 
Throughout each cryptosystem the two functions compressQ and expandQ are used to 
represent EC point compression and expansion. This is the process of sending one 
coordinate and 1 bit of the other coordinate, instead of sending both coordinates of an 
EC point. For a definition of compressQ see [29, A.9.6] and for expandQ see [29, 
A. 12.9]. Also, for the sake of simplicity the dependence on the PRNG, G, has been 
removed fi-om these cryptosystems. 
The schemes here will be for an EC defined over a prime field; they can be easily 
modified for an EC over a binary extension field. Also, it is assumed that the choice 
of the coefficients ¿z and 6 are such that the resulting EC is not supersingular or 
anomalous and that the number of points on the curve has a large prime factor (this 
ensures security against algorithms that solve the DLP in arbitrary groups). 
4.4 .1 ECZS-OWH 
Here the repaired ZS-OWH is transformed to its EC equivalent. 
ECZS-OWH 
Preliminaries 
For a large prime p, choose appropriate a and b to define an EC. Consider messages 
of length n = \p\ + \ -k, and a one-way hash function H with output length k. Find a 
point on the EC, G, that generates the large prime sub-group. 
Key Generation 
Randomly choose a secret key g GF(p) and calculate public key YR = XRG. 
Encryption 
To encrypt a message m 
1) ;ceR[l,j^-l] 
2) z = compress(xYR) 
3) i = H(m||z) 
4) ci = compress(xG) 
5) C2=ze(m\\ t ) 
Ciphertext is (ci, C2) 
Decryption 
1) C = expand(ci) 
2) z' = compress(xR • C) 
3) W = z'®C2 
4) m = W[i,.,n] 
5) t'=W[n+\...\p\] 
If H(m II z') = f then output m else output 0 . 
4.4.2 ECZS-UHF 
Here ZS-UHF is transformed to its EC equivalent. 
ECZS-UHF 
Preliminaries 
For a large prime p, choose appropriate ¿7 and ¿> to define an EC. Consider messages 
of length « = IpI + 1 - and a (strong) universal hash function Hs that is indexed by a 
string of length k. Find a point on the EC, G, that generates the large prime sub-
group. 
Key Generation 
Randomly choose a secret key XR S GF(p) and calculate public key YR = XRG. 
Encryption 
To encrypt a message m 
1) XGK[hp-l l 
2) r = compress(XYR) 
3) z = + 
5 ) c\ = compress(xG) 
6) C2 = H,(m) 
7) C 3 = z e w 
Ciphertext is {cu cj, c^) 
Decryption 
1) C= expand(ci) 
2) r' = compress(xR • C) 
4 ) s' =r^ + 2-k...]p\ + \] 
5) m=z'®C3 
IfH^Cw) = C2 then output m else output 0 . 
4.5 Implementation 
Before the attack on the original ZS-OWH was discovered, the original ZS-OWH and 
its elhptic curve equivalent were implemented solely by the author. The schemes 
were implemented in the Java programming language using the Java Development Kit 
(JDK) version 1.3 beta [66] and a third party implementation (due to USA export 
laws) of the Java Cryptographic Environment (JCE) by the AustraUan Business 
Access Pty Ltd (ABA) [65]. Java was used as the programming language as it has 
extensive support for multiple precision arithmetic. 
The JCE allows for the simplest creation of cryptogr^hic algorithms and provides 
many standard algorithms too, like DES, SHA etc. The JCE lets programmers create 
an entire cryptographic suite, called a Provider. From the user's point of view, if they 
want to use an algorithm, they see which Providers implement their desired algorithm 
and choose the implementation they want. So a Provider was created that 
implemented the origmal ZS-OWH and ECZS-OWH. 
The implementation of cryptographic algorithms is made simpler by the JCE. It lays 
out all the methods (Java's name for functions) that need to be written in order for the 
algorithm to work, and the programmer just writes the code for each method, 
appropriate for the algorithm being implemented. Of course anyone who has ever 
implemented cryptographic algorithms knows this tasks is not as easy as it sounds. 
The main advantage of using the JCE is that the user is provided with a consistent 
interface, the interface is the same regardless of Provider and algorithm type 
(cryptosystem, hash function, signature). 
Implementing ECZS-OWH was more difficult than ZS-OWH as Java has no support 
for elliptic curves and so all the fundamentals of elliptic curves over binary extension 
fields needed to be implemented as well. 
The code of this implementation can be found on a diskette in a pocket at the back of 
this thesis. 

CHAPTER 5 SiGNCRYPTION 
In 1997 Zheng [68] introduced a new notion that he termed 'signcryption' which 
combined digital signatures and encryption. Up until then the notions of 
confidentiality and authentication had been considered separately by most, or at best 
had been combined through simple concatenation. All the work in this chapter, not 
specifically referenced, is original work by the author. 
5.1 Background 
5.1.1 Principle 
The principle behind signcryption (from Zheng) can be basically summed up in one 
inequality. 
Cost(Signcryption) < Cost(Signature) + Cost(Encryption) 
Signcryption is the process of achieving authentication and confidentiality at a 'cost' 
less than preforming authentication and confidentiality independently. Exactly how 
'cost' is evaluated is not specified, as it is a relative term, depending on the 
application. Zheng used computational cost and communication cost. Computational 
cost is a measure of the number of operations it takes to implement a scheme, 
practically this means counting the number of dominant operations such as 
exponentiation or inversion. Communication cost is a measure of the amount of bits a 
scheme needs to send per ciphertext. Both computational and communication cost for 
a signcryption scheme can be compared with a signature-then-encryption scheme to 
judge the effectiveness of the signcryption scheme. 
5.1.2 Definition 
For the first time a signcryption scheme is given a formal definition. A signcryption 
scheme can be defined in much the same way as an encryption scheme. 
A signcryption scheme can be formally defined via a triple of algorithms 77= (î^. S, 
• X, the Key Generation Algorithm. A probabilistic algorithm that takes a security 
parameter k e M and returns a pair (jc, y) of matching secret and public keys. 
• S, the Signcryption Algorithm. A probabilistic algorithm that takes the public key 
of the receiver yR, the private key of the sender and a message m e {0, 1} to 
produce a signcryptogram c. 
• % the Unsigncryption Algorithm. A deterministic algorithm that takes the private 
key of the receiver XR, the public key of the sender and the signcryptogram c, to 
return the message m or a special symbol 0 to indicate the signcryptogram was 
invalid. 
We require that for all (jc, y) which can be output by ^(1^), for all m e {0, 1} , and for 
all c that can be output by Ŝ ^ ^̂  (m), we have that {c)=m. We also require that 
S and 'U can be computed in polynomial time. 
Part of the definition of signcryption could include the notion of 'cost' but it is a very 
relative term, not only as to how 'cost' is evaluated but also the encryption and 
signature schemes the 'cost' of the signcryption scheme is compared too. The goal of 
this thesis in formally defining signcryption is to allow for meaningfiil statements 
about the security of a signcryption scheme, not formally defining 'cost' will have no 
effect on evaluating security. 
Zheng uses the phrase 'signcrypted text' to describe the output of the signcryption 
algorithm, this thesis uses the phrase 'signcryptogram', for no other reason than it is 
more convenient. 
Formally defining a signcryption scheme becomes very usefiil when defining notions 
of security, as this in turn allows the security of cryptosystems based on this new 
notion (signcryption), to be formally expressed. 
Although Zheng did not formally define signcryption, he did give some properties 
that he argued all signcryption schemes must fiilfil. 
1. Unique unsigncryptability - The unsigncryption algorithm unambiguously 
recovers the message m fi-om the signcryptogram c. 
2. Security - The signcryption scheme simultaneously fiilfils the properties of a 
secure encryption scheme and a secure signature scheme. 
3. Efficiency - The computational and communication cost of the signcryption 
scheme is smaller than that of the best currently known signature-then-encryption 
schemes with comparable parameters. 
Zheng points out that conditions 2 and 3 justify the introduction of signcryption as a 
new concept as it clearly shows that signcryption is not the same as signature-then-
encryption. 
5.1.3 Signcryption versus Authenticated Encryption 
Signcryption and authenticated encryption are two very similar ideas, it holds that 
signcryption achieves authenticated encryption whereas authenticated encryption does 
not necessarily achieve signcryption. Hence all the definitions and results that are 
true for signcryption, are also true for authenticated encryption. 
In the previous section, the properties of a signcryption scheme included efficiency 
and it is tempting to consider this the only difference between signcryption and 
authenticated encryption. However, authenticated encryption can always and easily 
be achieved by concatenation of independent and secure signature and encryption 
schemes (or vice-versa). It is important to note that it is not trivial to derive a 
signcryption scheme fi-om secure signature and encryption schemes, indeed it is all 
too easy to destroy both authentication and confidentiality. 
So although Zheng justifies signcryption as worthy of being a new concept in 
cryptography, to his argument should be added, that never before has a cryptographic 
notion focused on the interplay between authentication and confidentiality. Clever 
use of this interplay will allow schemes to be derived where authentication and 
confidentiality complement each other. 
5.2 Notions of Security 
The notions of security that exist for encryption allow for meaningful discussion 
about the security of encryption schemes, similarly for signature schemes. So it is 
only natural that for a combination of encryption and signature schemes there needs to 
be defined similar notions of security, so the security of signcryption schemes can be 
analysed. The notions presented here are extensions of the notions of security for 
encryption and signature schemes, but the extension is the original work of the author. 
An extensive hierarchy of security levels is not given here. The reason is that in a 
practical signcryption scheme, the security should achieve a certain goal against a 
certain attack, if it does not then the signcryption scheme should not be used. 
Presented here are the significant goals and attacks. 
5.2.1 Attacks against Confidentiality 
The formal notation used, and the model of the adversary in this section is the same as 
those used in sections 2.7.1 and 2.7.2 respectively. 
The weakest attack against a signcryption scheme is a Known Signcryptogram Attack 
(KSA). In this attack an adversary is not given access to either the sender or receiver's 
signcryption or unsigncryption oracles. The adversary only has access to a 
polynomially bounded number of signcryptograms. This models the situation when 
the adversary can only eavesdrop on communications. 
In a Chosen Plaintext Attack (CPA) the adversary only has access to the signcryption 
oracle of the sender, this is the attack that is most available to an adversary (by 
making themselves the sender). The adversary can create a polynomially bounded 
number of signcryptograms thus obtaining a set of plaintext-signcryptogram pairs. 
The adversary then attempts to ascertain some information fi'om these pairs. 
The most powerful attack an adversary can have is a Chosen Signcryptogram Attack 
(CSA). The adversary has access to a signcryption oracle of the sender and an 
unsigncryption oracle of the receiver and may query both a polynomially bounded 
number of times. However, the adversary may not query the unsigncryption oracle 
with the challenge signcryptogram. 
CSA is a very strong attack, the adversary can not only create signcryptograms, 
whether valid or invalid, but can query the unsigncryption algorithm of the receiver 
(use it as an oracle), with the exception of the challenge signcryptogram. This is an 
adaptive attack since the adversary can query the unsigncryption oracle with 
signcryptograms related to the challenge signcryptogram. 
5.2.2 Indistinguishability of Signcryptions 
As with IND, indistinguishability of signcryptions (INDS) captures the notion that an 
adversary can gain no information about the message of a signcryptogram other than 
its length (but may be able to authenticate). This goal is achieved by giving the 
adversary one signcryptogram and asking the adversary to choose which of two 
plaintexts were signcrypted. 
Exactly the same notation as section 2.7.1 is used. 
Definition 10 [INDS-CPA, INDS-CSA] Let 77= S, ^ be a signcryption scheme 
and let A = (Ai, A2) be an adversary. For atk e {cpa, csa} and A: e N let 
Adv-;^-'«' (k) = 2- Pr [ (p^, , ) ^ K (1^); J ^ K (1*); 
{pk^,sks)-,b <- {0,1}; 
>' ^pk.^ks k ) : (^0 > > •y. = ¿ J - 1 
where 
If atk = cpa then ^i(-) = 8 and ^2(0 = s 
If atk = csa then (•) and = (•) 
It is insisted that Ai outputs xq, xi with |xo| = \xi\. In the case of CSA, it also insisted 
that A2 does not ask its oracle to unsigncrypt y. We say that 77 is secure in the sense 
of INDS-ATK if ̂  being polynomial-time imphes that Adv^;^"'^ (•) is neghgible. | 
5.2.3 Not Existentially Forgeable 
Since signcryption covers both confidentiality and authentication, having defined how 
to evaluate the confidentiality of a signcryption scheme, the same must be done for 
authentication. 
Analogous to confidentiality, two types of attackers can be defined for authentication. 
A Known Message Attack (KMA) is by an adversary that has access to a list of 
signcryptograms and their corresponding messages. Since this is supposed to 
correspond to the normal signature KMA, an adversary against a signcryption scheme 
needs access to the receiver's unsigncryption oracle. This is because for a normal 
signature scheijie verification is public, but this is not necessarily true for 
signcryption. A signcryption scheme may or may not have its authentication publicly 
verifiable, and for consistency an adversary should either always be able to verify or 
never be able to. To force an adversary to never be able to verify would mean 
changing the definition of signcryption so public verification is not allowed. 
A Chosen Signcryptogram Attack (CSA) is the same as CSA defined for 
confidentiality. The adversary has access to both the sender's signcryption oracle and 
the receiver's unsigncryption oracle. 
The strongest goal for any signature scheme is for it to be Not Existentially Forgeable 
(NEF), and this is the same for a signcryption scheme. NEF means an adversary is 
unable create a valid signcryptogram that contains a forgery oi any message (whether 
known or not known by the adversary). NEF for a signcryption scheme means there 
is no message that can be forged (although messages can always be forged with a 
negUgible probability). 
5.2.4 Problems with combining Confidentiality and Authentication 
The notions of security for signcryption are more difficult to appreciate than for 
encryption or signature schemes. An important issue is the oracles an adversary has 
access too. If the adversary is trying to forge a signature, then access to an 
imsigncryption oracle is of less use than a signcryption oracle, but the reverse is true 
for an adversary trying to break confidentiality. So a weak adversary against 
confidentiality is similar to a strong one against authentication, and vice versa. 
This means that a signcryption scheme that has weak confidentiality security, like 
INDS-CPA, but strong authentication security, like NEF-CSA, does not really make 
sense. An NEF-CSA adversary has access to both oracles, but this means the attacker 
is also an INDS-CSA attacker against confidentiality. The potential is for an 
adversary against confidentiality to be used as one against authentication, or vice 
versa. 
This inevitably leads to the need for a signcryption scheme to always have its 
confidentiality and authentication secure against the most powerful adversary, one 
with access to both oracles. 
5.3 Plaintext Awareness 
The notion of PA for signcryption is defined for the first time here and is exactly 
analogous to the notion of PA for confidentiality. PA for signcryption means that an 
adversary against a signcryption scheme should not be able to create a signcryptogram 
for which they do not know the plaintext. It is arguable that this notion is even more 
important for signcryption schemes as it obviously related to an adversary's ability to 
forge. 
See section 2.8 for the notation and definitions of hH and C. 
Definition 11 - {PA) Let 77= S, ^ be a signcryption scheme, let B be an 
adversary, and let K be an algorithm (the "knowledge extractor"). For any A: G N let 
?Y[H <- Hash; (PK^, J ^ K (l ' ) ; {PK^, J ^ K ( l ' ) ; 
We insist y € C; that is, B never outputs a string y which coincides with the value 
returned from some -query. We say that is a A-(/:)-extractor if K has running 
time polynomial in the length of its inputs and for every adversary B, 
Succ n ^ • We say that 77is secure in the sense of PA if JJis secure in the 
sense of INDS-CPA and there exists a X(A:)-extractor ̂  where 1 - X(k) is neghgible. | 
As with the definition of PA for confidentiality, the definition for signcryption is 
restricted to the random oracle model. 
PA is not a notion of security, it is rather a property of a cryptosystem that implies a 
notion of security. For confidentiality, a PA scheme implies the scheme is secure 
against an IND-CCA2 adversary [3]. It will be assumed that the same result holds for 
signcryption, PA INDS-CSA. This is a reasonable assumption as essentially the 
only difference is encryption and decryption oracles are replaced with signcryption 
and unsigncryption oracles and the addition of the sender's secret key. These changes 
are unlikely to invalidate the proof of the theorem. 
C H A P T E R 6 NEW SIGNCRYPTION SCHEMES 
Presented in this chapter and for the first time are three new signcryption schemes all 
based on provably secure schemes (although all only so in the RO model). The three 
underlying schemes are Secure El-Gamal, Pointcheval [52] and OAE [4]. The 
signcryption schemes presented here will differ from the scheme presented by Zheng 
[68] as they will not use a private key (symmetric) cipher. The reason for starting 
from provably secure schemes is the hope that the changes made (to make them 
signcryption schemes) will not affect their confidentiality, in which case an argument 
about their authentication is all that remains. 
For each new scheme its signcryption and unsigncryption algorithms will be given, 
along with other relevant information, then its security will be evaluated in terms of 
both confidentiality and authentication. Finally both computational and 
communication cost will be given, which in turn is a justification for each to be 
considered a signcryption scheme 
6.1 Secure El-Gamal Signcryption 
Secure El-Gamal Signcryption is derived from Secure El-Gamal and an El-Gamal 
style signature. 
6.1.1 Scheme 
Secure El-Gamal Signcryption 
Preliminaries 
Consider messages of length n, and random oracles H and G with output length k and 
output length 2n, respectively. Operations are modulo p with a generator gi. 
Key Generation 
The private key of receiver is xr G GF(p) and public key is y^^ = g^" mod p. The 
sender has private key e GF(p) and public key y^ = g^' mod p . 
Signcryption 
Signcrypt message m 
1) Randomly choose ;c e r [ 1, 1 ] 
2) r = 
3) z = 
4) 
X 5) t = mod/7-1 N(m) + x^Cj 
6) C 3 = z e ( m | | 0 




3) W = z ' e c 3 
4) w = 
X m(m) i'ci N _ 
If \Si ys ) ~ then output m else output 0 
The basic change between this scheme and Secure El-Gamal is the variable t has 
changed from a hash of the message to a signature of the message, signed with the 
sender's private key. In the unsigncryption algorithm the signature of the message is 
checked and if it is verified the message is accepted. Importantly though the output of 
a random oracle is used to hide all partial information about the message and 
signature, meaning this scheme relies heavily on the output of the random oracle 
being random. 
This scheme can be made more efficient by calculating the signature in a large prime 
sup-group of;? - 1. This would give minimal expansion in the number of bits sent 
compared to the original Secure El-Gamal. 
6.1.2 Security 
Confidentiality follows from the security of Secure El-Gamal. 
Theorem 11 - Secure El-Gamal Signcryption is secure against a chosen 
signcryptogram attack in the random oracle model assuming that the Diffie-Hellman 
decision problem is hard in the group GF(p). 
The proof is the same as from Theorem 10 with the following changes. The simulator 
is changed to incorporate the sender's keys. Instead of relying on the security of 
original El-Gamal to show no partial information is leaked, the output of a random 
oracle is used to mask all information. The difficulty of guessing the hash of the 
message concatenated with random information is replaced with the difficulty of 
guessing the sender's private key. Since H is a random oracle, there is no way that 
two messages have the same signature, so the signature can't be recreated without 
Also, an adversary without xs cannot even create a new signature. If we assume that 
the signature is NEF-CSA then no argument needs to be made. | 
Authentication has essentially akeady been shown. The form of the signature is 
ahnost identical to DSS, which is considered safe, but is even more secure as the 
signature is not in the adversary's view. 
6.1.3 Cost 
Computational cost is measured by counting the number of significant operations, 
these include exponentiation and inversion. For Secure El-Gamal signcryption this 
comes to 6 operations. 
For communication overhead the most efficient implementation of Secure El-Gamal 
signcryption will be considered. This is when calculations are done in a large prime 
sub-group of p-\, with order q. The total number of bits that need to be sent, for 
messages of size \p\, is 2\q\ + 
6.2 Pointcheval Signcryption 
Pointcheval Signcryption (PS) is derived fi-om Pointcheval's modified El-Gamal [52] 




A partially trapdoor one-way function/ and another fimction that partially inverts it 
g. Work over group GF(/7), with p - \ having a large prime factor q, and a generator g 
of order q. A hash function, H, and PRNG, G. 
Key Generation 
The private key of receiver is xr E GF(P) and public key is y^ = mod p. The 
sender has private key jĉ  g GF(/7) and public key y^ = g^^ mod p . 
Signcryption 
Encrypt a message m 
1) Randomly choose r g r [ 1... 
2) (a) Using modified El-Gamal signature 
Solve H(/w, g') = xsg^ + rs mod q-lioxs 
(b) Using DSS 
Calculate s = + xsg') mod q-I 
(c) Using modified Schnorr signature scheme 
Calculate s = r-xsli(m, g') mod q - 1 
3) a=M,Il(m\\s) 
4) ¿ = 






(a) For modified El-Gamal 
Check ^ y^u' ' mod p 
(b) For DSS 
Calculate a = ms' ^ modq,j3 = us' ^ mod^ then check 
u = g"ys n i o d p m o d q 




else output 0 
This is a generic signcryption scheme. The only difference between this scheme and 
Pointcheval's original scheme is the variable s, which was random in the original, but 
is the signature in this scheme. 
6.2.2 Security 
The confidentiality of (PS) can be shown using a very similar proof as that used by 
Pointcheval for his original encryption scheme. The original proof first showed the 
scheme to be secure in the sense of IND-CPA, then defined a knowledge extractor for 
the scheme and used the definition of PA to show the scheme was IND-CCA2. 
Theorem 12 - PS is secure in the sense oflNDS-CPA. 
Exactly the same proof as [52] will be used with a few minor changes. The original 
proof of security in the IND-CPA sense assumes that an IND-CPA attacker exists and 
then by observing its oracle queries the one-way function, f , can be inverted. The 
same is done here, except the security now needs to be in the INDS-CPA sense. This 
means the secret key of the sender is incorporated. Another minor change is r changes 
to g''-, this has no effect on the proof 
The only other change is s is no longer random, but a signature. However, s being 
random is not essential for the proof, but it actually is random fi-om the adversary's 
point of view as they do not have access to an unsigncryption oracle and so couldn't 
distinguish a signature fi-om a random string. | 
Theorem 13 - PAS is secure in the sense oflNDS-CSA. 
All that needs to be done is to define a knowledge extractor, K, for the scheme and 
then use the definition of PA. The first part of the knowledge extractor comes directly 
fi-om Pointcheval's original proof: 
"The simulator S considers all the queries asked to G and H, (r, Ĝ -) and {q, 
UgX and checks if for some pair (r, q), both equalities a =f{r, H^) and 6 = ^ 0 
G, hold." [52, pg. 138] 
Then K recovers the message m and signature s fi-om q, and verifies s using (r, m). 
With a knowledge extractor defined and the scheme being INDS-CPA by Theorem 
12, then the scheme fiilfils PA, and so is INDS-CSA (as it was assumed PA INDS-
CPA). I 
Authentication is easy to show since the security of the signature schemes used is 
widely accepted (except for modified Schnorr, so this would need some security 
justifications). So there is a negligible chance that an adversary could create a forged 
signature, and since the signature is hidden in the signcryptogram an adversary could 
not change a vahd signature into a forged signature. 
6.2 .3 Cost 
The computational cost of PS will be measured using the El-Gamal instantiation that 
Pointcheval derived in [52] and using the modified El-Gamal signature. This leads to 
a total of 8 operations (if modified Schnorr was used this would be 7, but there is a 
question mark over its security). 
The communication cost, for a message of length |p|, is + |p. 
6.3 Optimal Asymmetric Signcryption 
Optimal Asymmetric Signcryption (OAS) is derived from OAE [4] and a standard 
RSA signature scheme. Since OAS is derived from OAE it exists in a generic form, 
however the scheme presented here is instantiated with RSA. 
6.3 .1 Scheme 
OAS 
Preliminaries 
Generate two strong primes p and q and calculate N = pq. Messages are of length 
and a random number of length ko is needed, so that \N\ = n + ko + k\. Also need two 
random oracles, H taking strings of length « + A:i to strings of length ko, and G taking 
strings of length kp to strings of length n-^k\. 
Key Generation 
Generate a random number XR, such that gcd(jc;?, A^ = 1, as the public key of the 
receiver and solve for yR in XJ^r = 1 mod (|)(A^ for the private key. Similarly for the 
sender, generate ys, and solve xsys = 1 mod ^{N) for xs. 
Signcryption 
To signcrypt a message m 
1) Choose random r of length ko 
2) = 
3) 5 = m ' e G ( r ) 
4) t = r@ll(s) 
5) w = s\\t 
6) y = 
Signcryptogram is ;; 
Unsigncryption 
1) w = 
2) s = wi..„ 
3) t = 
4) r = i eH(5) 
5) m'=s®G(r) 
6) If - then m = m\\,,,n] else output 0 
Note, the notation ' ' refers to a string of k\ zeroes. 
OAS is just OAE with the ciphertext signed using a standard RSA signature, so does 
it really qualify as a signcryption scheme? The argument for it being a signcryption 
scheme is that it is more efficient (in communication cost) than if OAE and the 
standard RSA signature were done independently. More importantly, it will be shown 
to be more secure, which means if the 'cost' is evaluated in terms of security then 
there is also a saving. 
6.3.2 Security 
The confidentiality of the scheme is already guaranteed by the underlying encryption, 
all that needs to be shown is that authentication is secure. 
Theorem 14 - OAS is secure against an INDS-CSA adversary. 
The reader is referred to the proof of OAE in [4]. It is trivial to show that if an IND-
CSA adversary can break OAS then they could be used by an IND-CCA2 adversary 
to break OAE. This is true because the only difference between the schemes is the 
signing of the ciphertext; hence an IND-CCA2 adversary can change their challenge 
ciphertext into an INDS-CSA adversary's challenge ciphertext by simply signing it. 
I 
The argument for the security of authentication of this scheme is based on the 
underlying OAE being PA. The authentication is secure in the sense of NEF-KMA as 
an adversary cannot create a signcryptogram for which they do not know the plaintext 
(definition of PA), so cannot create a signcryptogram for a plaintext other than one 
already in their list of message-signcryptogram pairs. 
There are well known homomorphic attacks against RSA signatures for an adaptive 
adversary, but these will not work against this scheme. Hence this scheme is more 
secure than if OAE and a standard RSA signature were used independently. An 
adversary only has a negligible chance of forging as there is only a negligible chance 
that the new ciphertext that is signed (has a signature on it forged) will be valid. This 
is because OAE is non-malleable (equivalent to IND), so an adversary can't forge a 
signcryptogram for a message that is meaningfiilly related to any message they have 
signcryptograms for. Also, since OAE is PA they cannot forge a signcryptogram for a 
message they do not know. However, there is a slim chance that an adversary could 
forge a signature on a message that is known to them, but is unrelated to any message-
signcryption pairs the adversary knows or creates. 
6.3.3 Cost 
The reason for using the phrase 'Optimal' in OAE was that encryption and decryption 
only needed 1 exponentiation each. For OAS signcryption and unsigncryption only 
need 2 exponentiations each, which is arguable optimal for a scheme incorporating 
confidentiality and authentication. This makes the computational cost 4 operations. 
Although OAS sends out bits, the message is shorter than this, so it is difficult to 
calculate the cost until real parameters are used. 
6.4 Cost Comparison 
Comparing the cost between the new schemes presented here and with possible 
signature-then-encryption schemes is difficult due to the differences in parameters. 
An important example of this is insisting the plaintext for two schemes be the same 
size, as two schemes with different sized plaintexts shouldn't be directly compared. 
Another important property is security assumptions, it isn't much use comparing a 
provably secure scheme to one with questionable security, since it is very hkely the 
scheme with questionable security will have significantly less cost. 
Presented here is a comparison between these new signcryption schemes and 
authenticated encryption schemes based on Pointcheval's El-Gamal and OAE. 
Pointchval's El-Gamal concatenated with Pointchval-Stem modilSed El-Gamal 
signature (both provably secure against IND-CCA2 and NEF-CMA respectively) has 
a computational cost of 8 operations and a communication cost of + \p\. OAE 
with standard RSA signature (OAE is provably secure the signature is not) has a 
computational cost of 4 operations and a communication cost dependent on 
parameters. 
Recall computational cost refers to the number of dominant operations that a scheme 
needs to preform and communication cost refers to the number of bits a scheme needs 
to send. Savings in cost are measured via. 
CostiAuthenticated Encryption) - CostiSisncryption) 
Cost(Authenticated Encryption) 
For example, a saving of 10% in computational cost would mean he signcryption 
scheme does 10% less dominant operations than the authenticated encryption scheme. 
Table 2 presents the results. The different plaintext sizes have been taken into 
account, for an El-Gamal type schemes the message size is equal to \p\ and for the 
RSA type schemes, for = = 1024, \m\ = 16S and for = = 4096, \m\ = 3072. 
Hence the message size for the RSA type schemes are always % that of the message 
size for the El-Gamal type schemes. The parameters were chosen to reflect 
appropriate sizes for use today and in 5-10 years time, depending on the progress of 
solving the DLP or factoring. 
It should be noted that the OAE with standard RSA signature is rather inefficient 
since the message being signed is smaller than the modulus being used, but this is a 
practical issue since otherwise the moduli of the sender and receiver would be of 
vastly different size. Also, counting an RSA exponentiation as 1 operation is 
questionable, as there exist methods for speeding up this calculation, however, for the 
sake of simpUcity it is left this way. 
Table 2 shows that the new signcryption schemes presented here offer useful savings 
in the short term. However, the savings in communication cost for the El-Gamal type 
schemes decrease as more secure parameters are used. This is because the savings are 
associated with the sub-group parameter and not the main parameter p, and as this 
increases, it becomes the dominant effect on communication overhead. The 
computational cost savings are the same regardless of the parameters used. 
Table 2 - Savings in Cost of the new Signcryption schemes over corresponding 

















And Sig. |p = 
1024,1^=160 
25% 26.3% 0% 17.5% 33.3%** 25.1%** 
El-Gamal Enc. 
And Sig. \p = 
4 0 9 6 , ^ = 2 5 6 
25% 14.3% 0% 9.5% 33.3%** -1.6%** 
OAEandRSA Sig. 
|/7| = iV| = 1024, 
(7=160 
-12.5%* 50.8%* -50%* 44.9%* 0% 50% 
OAE andRSA Sig. 
IpI = |7V| = 4096, 
q=256 
-12.5%* 57.8%* -50%* 55.4%* 0% 50% 
* Due to messages being different sizes 
savings = CostfAuth. Enc.) - 0.75Cost(Signcrvption) 
Cost(Auth. Enc.) 
** Due to messages being different sizes 
savings = Cost(Auth. Enc.) - (4/3)Cost(Signcrvption) 
Cost(Auth. Enc.) 
Comparing cost is difficult in the sense of obtaining unbiased information from the 
comparison, this can be seen just by simply comparing El-Gamal type schemes with 
RSA type schemes. In Zheng's original paper on signcryption [68] the scheme he 
suggests uses a symmetric key cipher and a keyed hashing function, both of which 
make his scheme slightly more efficient than the schemes suggested here. However, 
adding these components mean more assumptions have to be made in order for the 
scheme to be secure. So Zheng's original scheme has not been compared to the new 
schemes presented here since computational or communication costs are biased by 
security assumptions. 
The results of Table 2 suggest that Secure El-Gamal signcryption is a good trade off 
between security and efficiency, with PS not far behind. OAS is efficient, but it has a 
question over its security. 
C H A P T E R 7 COMBINING NOTIONS O F 
SECURITY 
The security implications of signcryption were largely ignored by Zheng [68], but 
they are very relevant. Examining schemes that are secure in the sense of IND-CPA 
and IND-CCA2 reveal that the IND-CPA schemes are inevitable more efficient, that 
is they have lower computational and communication cost. The same result is 
apparent between signature schemes that are NEF-KMA and NEF-CMA. Now if a 
weak encryption (or signature) scheme could be combined with a strong signature (or 
encryption) scheme to achieve a better notion of security then it is probable that the 
cost of the scheme would be small. 
This chapter asks some new questions about combining encryption and signature 
schemes and offers some original discussion towards their possible answer. 
7.1 Does NEF-CMA + IND-CPA = INDS-CSA? 
Consider starting with an encryption scheme secure in the sense of IND-CPA and 
concatenating to it (or creating a signcryption scheme with) a signature scheme secure 
in the sense of NEF-CMA, what would the security be? 
Mentioned in section 5.3 was the apparent importance of a signature to determine if a 
scheme fulfilled the notion of PA, this importance is highlighted here. Consider an 
NEF-CMA + IND-CPA scheme, to fulfil the notion of PA, an adversary must not be 
able to create a signcryptogram for which they do not know the plaintext. This 
scheme achieves this, because if an adversary could create a signcryptogram, this 
involves signing, but since they do not know the message they achieve existential 
forgery, but by assumption the scheme is secure in the sense of NEF-CMA. This does 
imply though that the signature part of the scheme signs the message and not the 
ciphertext. Since, by assumption the scheme is IND-CPA (and hence INDS-CPA if 
scheme is a concatenation), the notion of PA is fulfilled and the scheme is INDS-CSA 
as PA INDS-CSA. 
Unfortunately, what seems intuitively nice is not easily obtainable as a proof. The 
problem lies with definition of PA, it is only true in the RO model and requires the 
definition of a knowledge extractor. The knowledge extractor is part of the definition 
of PA so it can be shown the adversary knew the plaintext for any ciphertext (or 
signcryptogram) they create. However, a generic knowledge extractor cannot be 
defined in a proof for the intuitive argument above. It is tempting to use a knowledge 
extractor that just outputs a 'invalid ciphertext (signcryptogram)', no matter what the 
input, since it is known the adversary can't create a ciphertext (except fi-om an 
encryption oracle). But the problem is the adversary can cheat and submit a 
ciphertext they do know the plaintext for, and this would defeat the proof 
If this conjecture was true, consider combining original El-Gamal (which is secure in 
the sense of IND-CPA) and DSS (which is secure in the sense of NEF-KMA), in the 
following scheme. 
Original EI-Gamal and DSS 
Preliminaries 
Work over group GF(/7), with p - \ having a large prime factor q, and a generator g of 
order A hash fiinction H. 
Key Generation 
The private key of receiver is xr G GF(p) and public key is yj^ = g""" modp . The 
sender has private key e GF(p) and public key y^ = g""' mod p . 
Signcryption 
Encrypt a message m 
1 ) Randomly choose r e r [ 1... 
2) Calculate s = f\m + xsg") mod q-I 
3) 
4) = 
Signcryptogram is (ci, C2> s) 
Unsigncryption 
1) m = 
2) Calculate a = ms' ^ modq,j3 = us' ' mod^ then check 
l f u = g"yl m o d m o d ^ then output m else 0 
This scheme uses only 3 exponentiations and 3 inversions and outputs 2\q\ + \p\ bits 
(the same as Zheng's scheme [68]). Hence it is not difficult to see that the truth of 
this conjecture would be useful in creating efficient signcryption schemes. 
7.2 Does NEF-KMA + IND-CCA2 = NEF-CSA? 
Consider starting with an encryption scheme secure in the sense of IND-CCA2 and 
concatenating to it (or creating a signcryption scheme with) a signature scheme secure 
in the sense of NEF-KMA, what would the security be? 
It seems that the combination of two schemes of this type would not necessarily yield 
a more secure scheme in any sense. An adaptive adversary against NEF-KMA can 
forge signatures. The adversary then just needs pass the message (that had its 
signature forged) to the encryption algorithm and create a vahd ciphertext. 
Combining signature and ciphertext would yield a valid, yet forged signcryptogram. 
Although probably still not secure, if the NEF-KMA + IND-CCA2 scheme is forced 
to sign the ciphertext rather than the plaintext then this appears to be more secure than 
the general case. An adaptive adversary will find it difficult to use an existing 
signcryptogram to create a forgery. If the encryption scheme is PA this cannot be 
achieved because doing so would be to create a ciphertext outside of using the 
encryption oracle. The adversary could forge if they could just sign one ciphertext, 
but this is selective forgery, SEL-CMA. So there seems to be an argument that SEL-
CMA + PA = NEF-CSA, if the ciphertext is signed. 

C H A P T E R 8 CONCLUSION 
There are several new and interesting results to take from this thesis. 
Some minor theorems about elliptic curves were presented. Although the theorems 
are not new work, the proofs provided for the theorems possible represent an original 
contribution. 
The one-way hash variant of the original Zheng-Seberry cryptosystem (ZS-OWH) 
was shown insecure against an IND-CCA2 adversary. Although a minor change to 
the scheme could thwart this attack, the security would still be questionable. Hence, 
the goal of modifying ZS-OWH into a provably secure scheme was set. To achieve 
this, aspects of the proof from the provably secure scheme by Cramer-Shoup [15] 
(CS) were borrowed and applied to a variant of El-Gamal. This resulted in a new 
provably secure scheme called 'Secure El-Gamal', unfortunately its proof rehes on 
the RO model, but only in a minimal way, as it was just required so the hash leaks no 
partial information. 
The Secure El-Gamal scheme is far more efficient than the CS scheme. So as is often 
the case in cryptography there is a trade off between the assurance of security and 
efficiency. This trade off is best highlighted by the use of the RO model, where 
perfectly random hash fiinctions are assumed to exist, and this results in very efficient 
schemes. 
The notion of signcryption, which was introduced by Zheng [68], has been further 
developed to allow for more formal discussions on the security of a signcryption 
scheme. This has been achieved by defining notions of security for signcryption 
schemes that are based upon the notions of security for the underlying signature and 
encryption schemes. Prior to this thesis, no such formal definitions existed. 
However, this task is made difficult by the differences between an adversary against 
confidentiality and one against authentication. These new notions of security allow 
for an adversary against strong confidentiality to also be one against weak 
authentication and vice versa. This impHes that it is always necessary for a 
signcryption scheme to have both strong confidentiality and authentication security. 
This thesis also presented three new signcryption schemes. All three were based on 
provably secure (under some assumptions) encryption schemes. The new notions of 
security for signcryption schemes and the proofs of security for the underlying 
schemes allowed for informal proofs of confidentiality security for the signcryption 
schemes (under some assumptions). Strong arguments were made for the 
authentication security of Secure El-Gamal Signcryption and Pointcheval 
Signcryption. 
Some ideas for future work were discussed regarding combining weak encryption 
with strong signatures to achieve stronger encryption. Intuitive arguments were 
made, but the result could not be formally proven. Similarly combining strong 
encryption with weak signatures was also addressed, but this seemed unlikely to 
achieve stronger signatures. 
C H A P T E R 9 BIBLIOGRAPHY 
1. Adamson, LT., Introduction to Field Theory. 1964: Oliver and Boyd. 
2. Atkins, A., "The number of points on an elliptic curve modulo a prime". 
1991(Draft). 
3. Bellare, M., Desai, A., Pointcheval, D., and Rogaway, P. "Relations among 
notions of security for public-key encryption schemes" in CRYPTO'98. LNCS 
1462, pg 26-45. Springer-Verlag, Cahfomia, 1998. 
4. Bellare, M. and Rogaway, P. "Optimal asymmetric encryption - how to encrypt 
with RSA" in EUROCRYTP'94. LNCS 950, pg 92-111. Springer-Verlag, 
1994. 
5. Bellare, M. and Rogaway, P. "Random Oracles are practical: a paradigm for 
designing efficient protocols" in Proceedings of the 1st Annual Conference on 
Computing and Communications Security. 1993. 
6. Bender, A. and Castagnoh, G. "On the implementation of elliptic curve 
cryptosystems" in CRYPTO'89. LNCS 435, pg 186-192. Springer-Verlag, 
1989. 
7. Blake, L, Seroussi, G., and Smart, N., "Elliptic curves in cryptography". 
London Mathematical Society Lecture Note Series, 1999. 265. 
8. Bleichenbacher, D. "Chosen ciphertext attacks against protocols based on the 
RSA encryption standard PKCS#1" in CRYPTO'98. LNCS 1462, pg 1-12. 
Springer-Verlag, California, 1998. 
9. Blum, Feldman, and Micali. "Non-interactive zero-knowledge and its 
applications" in Proceedings of the 20th Annual ACM Symposium on Theory 
of Computing. 1988. 
10. Blum, M. and Goldwasser, S. "An efficient probabilistic public key 
encryption scheme which hides all partial information" in CRYTPO'84. LNCS 
196, pg 289-299. Springer-Verlag, 1984. 
11. Boneh, D. "The decision Diffie-Hellman problem" in Third Algorithmic 
Number Theory Symposium (ANTS). LNCS 1423, Springer-Verlag, 1998. 
12. Burton, D.M., Elementary Number Theory. 1980, Boston: Allyn and Bacon. 
13. Canetti, R., Goldreich, O., and Halevi, S., "The Random Oracle methodolgy, 
revisited". 1998, available at http://theory.lcs.mit.edu/~oded/rom.html. 
14. Cohen, H., A Course in Computational Algebraic Number Theory. Graduate 
Texts in Mathematics. Vol. 138. 1996, New York: Springer-Verlag. 
15. Cramer, R. and Shoup, V. "A practical public key cryptosystem provably 
secure against adaptive chosen ciphertext attack" in CRYPTO'98. LNCS 1462, 
pg 13-25. Springer-Verlag, California, 1998. 
16. Damagard, I. "Towards practical public key systems secure against chosen 
ciphertext attacks" in CRYPTOVL LNCS 576, pg 433-444. Springer-Verlag, 
1991. 
17. Demytko, N. "A new elliptic curve based analogue of RS A" in 
EUROCRYPTVS. LNCS 765, pg 40-49. Springer-Verlag, 1993. 
18. Diffie, W. and Hellman, M., "New directions in cryptography". IEEE 
Transactions on Information Theory^ 1976. IT-22: p. 644-654. 
19. Dolev, D., Dwork, C., and Naor, N. "Non-malleable cryptography" in 
Proceedings of the 23rd Annual Symposium on Theory of Computing, pg 542-
552. 1991. 
20. ds.dial.pipex.com/george.barwood/ec_faq.txt 
21. El-Gamal, T., "A pubhc key cryptosystem and a signature scheme based on 
discrete logarithms". IEEE Transactions on Information Theory, 1985. IT-
31(4): p. 460-472. 
22. Elkies, N.D., "Explicit isogenics". 1991(Draft). 
23. Ellis, G., Rings and Fields. 1992: Oxford University Press. 
24. Fujisaki, E. and Okamoto, T. "How to enhance the security of public-key 
encryption at minimum cost" in PKC'99. LNCS 1560, pg 53-68. Springer-
Verlag, 1999. 
25. Goldwasser, Macali, and Rivest, "A digital signature scheme secure against 
adaptive chosen-message attacks". Siam Journal of Computing, 1988. 17(2). 
26. Goldwasser, Micali, and Rivest. "A 'paradoxical' solution to the signature 
problem" 'mFOCS'84. 1984. 
27. Goldwasser, S. and MicaU, S., "Probabilistic encryption". Journal of 
Computer and System Sciences, 1984. 28: p. 270-299. 
28. http://www.certicom.com 
29. IEEE, "PI363 - Standard specifications for public key cryptography". , 
http://grouper.ieee.org/groups/1363/index.html. 
30. Ireland, K. and Rosen, M., A Classical Introduction to Modern Number 
Theory. Graduate Texts in Mathematics. Vol. 84. 1980, New York: Springer-
Verlag. 
31. Izu, T., Kogure, J., Noro, M., and K, Y. "Efficient implementation of Schoof s 
algorithm" mASIACRYPTVS. LNCS 1514, pg 66-79. Springer-Verlag, 1998. 
32. Koblitz, N. "CM-curves with good cryptographic properties" in CRYPTO'91. 
LNCS 576, pg 279-287. Spinger-Verlag, 1991. 
33. Koblitz, N. "Constructing elliptic curve cryptosystems in characteristic 2" in 
CRYPTO'90. LNCS 537, pg 155-168. Springer-Verlag, 1990. 
34. Koblitz, N., "Elliptic curve cryptosystems". Mathematics of Computation, 
1987. 48: p. 203-209. 
35. Koyama, K., Maurer, U., Okamoto, T., and Vanstone, S. "New pubhc-key 
schemes based on elliptic curves over the ring Z^" in CRYPTO'91. LNCS 576, 
pg 252-266. Springer-Verlag, 1991. 
36. Lay, G. and Zimmer, H. "Constructing elliptic curves with given group order 
over large finite fields" in Algebraic Number Theory: First International 
Symposium. LNCS 877, pg 250-263. Springer-Vertag, 1994. 
37. Ledermann, W., Introduction to Group Theory. 1973, Edinburgh: Oliver and 
Boyd. 
38. Lenstra, A. and Lenstra, H., Algorithms in Number Theory, in Handbook of 
Theoretical Computer Science, J. Leeuwen, Editor. 1990, Eisevier Science 
Publishers, p. 677-681. 
39. Lercier, R. "Finding good random elliptic curves for cryptosystems defined 
over F2n" in EUORCRYPT97. LNCS 1233, pg 379-392. Springer-Verlag, 
1997. 
40. Lercier, R. and Morain, F. "Counting the number of points on elliptic curves 
over finite fields: strategies and performances" in EUROCRYPT'95. pg 79-94. 
Springer-Veriag, 1995. 
41. Menezes, A., Okamota, T., and Vanstone, S. "Reducing elltipic curve 
logarithms to logarithms in a fintite field" in Proceedings of the 23rd Annual 
ACM Symposium on the Theory of Computing (STOC'91). pg 80-89. 1991. 
42. Menezes, A. and Vanstone, S. "The implementation of elliptic curve 
cryptosystems" in AUSCRYPT90. LNCS 453, pg 2-13. Springer-Veriag 
1990. 
43. Menezes, A., Vanstone, S., and Zuccerato, R., "Counting points on elliptic 
curves over Mathematics of Computation, 1993. 60(201): p. 407-420. 
44. Menezes, A. J., Applications of Finite Fields. 1993, Boston: Kluwer Academic 
Publishers. 
45. Menezes, A. J., Elliptic curve public key cryptosystems. 1993, Boston: Kluwer 
Academic publishers. 
46. Menezes, A.J., van Oorschot, P.C., and Vanstone, S.A., Handbook of Applied 
Cryptography. Discrete Mathematics and its Applications, ed. K.H. Rosen. 
1997: CRC Press. 
47. Meyer, B. and Muller, V. "A public key cryptosystem based on elliptic curves 
over Z/nZ equivalent to factoring" in EUROCRYPT'96. LNCS 1146, pg 49-59. 
Springer-Verlag, 1996. 
48. Morain, F. "Building cyclic elliptic curves modulo large primes" in 
EUR0CRYPT91. LNCS 547, pg 328-336. Springer-Verlag, 1991. 
49. Naor, M. and Yung, M. "Public-key cryptosystems provably secure aginast 
chosen ciphertext attacks" in Proceedings of the Twenty Second Annual ACM 
Symposium on Theory of Computing, pg 427-437. 1990. 
50. Niederreiter, H. and Lidl, R., Finite Fields. 1983: Addison-Wesley Pub. Co. 
51. NIST, "Digital Signature Standard (DSS)", FIPS PUB 186, US, Department 
of Commerce, 1994. 
52. Pointcheval, D. "Chosen-ciphertext security for any one-way cryptosystem" 
in PKC 2000. LNCS 1751, pg 129-145. Springer-Verlag, 2000. 
53. Pointcheval, D. and Stem, J. "Security proofs for signature schemes" in 
EUROCRYPT96. LNCS 1070, pg 387-398. Springer-Verlag, 1996. 
54. Rabin, M., "Digital signatures and public key encryption as intractable as 
factorization". Technical Report, MIT/LCS/TR-212, M.I.T, 1978. 
55. Rackoff and Simon. "Non-interactive zero-knowledge proof of knowledge 
and chosen ciphertext attack" in CRYPTO'91. 1991. 
56. Rivest, R., Shamir, A., and Adleman, L., "A Method for obtaining digital 
signatures and pubHc key cryptosystems". Comm. ACM, 1978. 21(2). 
57. Satoh, T. and Arako, K., "Fermât quotients and the polynomial time discrete 
log algorithm for anomalous elliptic curves". 1997. preprint. 
58. Schnorr, C. "Efficient identification and signatures for smart cards" in 
CRYPTO'89. LNCS 435, pg 235-251. Springer-Verlag, 1989. 
59. Schoof, R., "Elliptic curves over finite fields and the computation of square 
roots mod Mathematics of Computation, 1985. 44(170): p. 483-494. 
60. Shoup, V. "Using hash functions as a hedge against chosen ciphertext attack" 
in EUROCRYPT'OO. LNCS 1807, pg 275-288. Springer-Verlag, 2000. 
61. Silverman, J.H., The Arithmetic of Elliptic Curves. 1986, New York: 
Springer-Verlag. 
62. Smart, N., "An attack on the ECDLP for anomalous elliptic curves". 1997, 
Announcement in the NMBRTHRY-List. 
63. Stewart, I.N. and Tall, D.O., Algebraic Number Theory. 1979, New York: 
John Wiley and Sons. 
64. Tsiounis, Y. and Yung, M. "On the security of El-Gamal based encryption" in 




68. Zheng, Y. "Digital signcryption or how to achieve Cost(Signature & 
Encryption) « Cost(Signature) + Cost(Encryption)" in CRYPTO'97. LNCS 
1294, pg 165-179. Springer-Verlag, Cahfomia, 1997. 
69. Zheng, Y., "Improved public key cryptosystems secure against chosen 
ciphertext attacks". Technical Report 94-1, University ofWollongong, 1994. 
70. Zheng, Y. and Seberry, J., "Immunizing public key cryptosystems against 
chosen ciphertext attacks". IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in 
Communications, 1993. 11(5): p. 715-724. 
ALFRED HARRIS (Bristol) LTD 
5 KINGSDOWN PARADE 
BRISTOL BS6 5UD 
Phone 0117 9292375 
Fax 0117 9273836 
